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ARTICLES
Targeted Pension Reform
COLLEEN E. MEDILL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government's single largest tax subsidy today is for a retirement plan'
system voluntarily sponsored by employers. In 2000, the amount of this tax subsidy was
$78.3 billion.2 Given the magnitude of the tax dollars involved, one would hope this tax
subsidy is designed to achieve the objective of national retirement policy,3 namely for
elderly Americans to enjoy an "adequate income in retirement in accordance with the
American standard of living."4 To the contrary, the pension tax law5 system that gener-
ates this enormous subsidy is driven not by policy, but rather by the ad hoc expediencies
of the federal budget balancing process. The troubling results have been instability and
.Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. I would like to thank Professors
Robert Lloyd, Don Leatherman and Katherine Moore for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
article, and Lawrence Magnovitz for his excellent research assistance. An earlier version of this article was
presented as part of the Tax Policy Panel at the August 2000 Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association
of American Law Schools.
I. Throughout the article I use the terms "retirement plan" and "pension" or "pension
plan"interchangeably. Unless the context indicates otherwise, both terms are used to refer to employment-
based "qualified plans" that meet all of the requirements of Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 401(a). As used in this article, the word "pension" refers to both defined benefit
and defined contribution (also known as individual account) plans, including 401(k) plans. Qualified plans
may or may not also be subject to the requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 26 and 29 of the United
States Code) [hereinafter "ERISA"]. Most significantly for purposes of this article, retirement plans sponsored
by governmental employers are exempt from both ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (ERISA's definition of a
governmental plan), § 1004(b)(1) (exempting government plans from coverage under ERISA), and from the
minimum coverage requirements of Code Section 410(b) as revised by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, see LR.C.
§ 410(c)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
2. See infra note 93.
3. By "national retirement policy" I am referring to an integrated view of Social Security and the tax poli-
cies that govern retirement plans and personal savings. See Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of
Retirement Security and Tax Policies, U. PA. L. REv 851-907 (April 1987).
4. Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-73, 79 Stat. 218, § 101(a), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 233.
5. Unless the context indicates otherwise, references to "pension tax law" throughout the article refer to
the requirements for qualified plans under Code Section 401(a).
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chaos in the pension tax laws. The consequence has been a retirement plan system that
fails to cover a substantial portion of the workforce, placing many workers at risk of
having an inadequate income during retirement.
Part II of this article describes how the federal budget balancing process inevitably
produces cycles in pension tax policy. In periods of budget deficits, pension tax law
becomes more "complex" as Congress amends the laws to reduce the amount of the
pension tax subsidy. These amendments, inscrutable except to relatively few pension tax
law experts, are in effect hidden, and thus politically palatable, tax increases. Con-
versely, in times of budget surplus the political debate over tax cuts naturally extends to
the pension tax laws, but often masquerades under the rubric of pension "simplification"
or "fairness."
Today, the federal government has a large and well-publicized budget surplus. This
surplus was estimated at $232 billion for 2000.6 As a result, Congress is considering
numerous legislative proposals aimed at pension tax law reform. Part III of the article
describes the policy choices imbedded in these proposals. In Part III, I criticize much of
the proposed pension reform legislation on three broad-based grounds. First, many of
the proposals are unlikely to expand retirement plan coverage to workers who currently
have none. Rather, these proposals are likely to enhance the benefits of higher income
employees who already have retirement plan coverage, reversing the progress that had
been made during the late 1980s and early 1990s toward making the pension tax law
system more equitable. Second, the potential of many of these proposals for draining the
fisc is likely to exaggerate the cyclical effects of the budget balancing process on pen-
sion tax law policy in the future. These cycles are detrimental because they undermine
the predictability and stability of the employer-based retirement plan system for both
employers and employees. Third, many of the proposals include provisions that would
allocate explicitly a greater portion of the pension tax subsidy to persons age 50 and
older. They essentially redistribute an even greater share of the pension tax subsidy to
the soon-to-be retired wealthy. Such provisions are likely to exacerbate the intergenera-
tional tensions that already exist in national retirement policy because of Social Secu-
rity.
The proposals I criticize in Part III appear to be based on a tacit consensus among
Congressional staff, outside experts, and lobbying groups concerning why pension cov-
erage has failed to expand in scope. I refer to this consensus as the "traditional approach"
to pension tax reform. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Congress significantly
reduced the tax incentives for employer-sponsored retirement plans. A byproduct of
these reductions was to make the administration of qualified plans by employers much
more complex. The traditional approach to pension tax reform focuses on these two
related factors as the primary reason why the scope of pension coverage has become
6. Quantifying the amount of this "surplus" is somewhat of a moving target. The most recent estimate
available as of the time this article went to press, was for a projected surplus of $232 billion for fiscal year
2000. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, CHAP. ONE at p. 1 (July
2000) (available on-line at http://www.cbo.gov). This estimate was $53 billion higher than the estimate
given just three months before in April of 2000. Id. at Summary, Section 2, p. 1. I use the terms "deficit" and
.surplus" throughout the article in the same way that lawmakers define these terms in the context of the federal
budget balancing process. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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stagnant. According to the logic of the traditional approach, reversing these trends will
result in expanded pension plan coverage.
To date the traditional approach has dominated proposals for pension tax law reform.
In Part IV I propose an alternative approach--the vision of "targeted pension reform." By
"targeted pension reform" I mean pension tax law legislation that is designed to expand
retirement plan coverage for rank-and-file workers and to enhance their opportunity to
achieve an adequate retirement income. In the process, targeted pension reform would
improve the distributional equities of the pension tax law system.
My legislative suggestions for achieving targeted pension reform, described in Part
V of the article, are not novel. I propose that Congress should close, or at least narrow,
the loopholes in the pension tax law system that reduce the scope of retirement plan
coverage and benefits for rank-and-file workers. These loopholes are well-known to
pension tax law experts. Despite this fact, none of the proposed pension reform legisla-
tion I discuss in Part III attempts to reform these loopholes. The fundamental obstacle to
targeted pension reform appears to be the fear, based on the assumptions that underlie
the traditional approach, that employers will respond by terminating retirement plans for
their employees rather than expand the scope of coverage.',
The central premise of this article is that employers will not terminate their retire-
ment plans in response to targeted pension reform. I argue that this fear of plan termina-
tion, which has stymied reform in the past, ignores the business context which shapes
and influences the employer's voluntary decision to sponsor a retirement plan. This
business context provides a much broader range of factors and incentives than the nar-
row view of employer behavior posited by the traditional approach.
Part IV analyzes and explains in detail why targeted pension reform will not trigger a
counterproductive backlash of plan terminations by employers. Part IV draws upon the
work of corporate governance scholars to develop an underlying theoretical foundation
that justifies targeted pension reform. This approach, the "targeted reform theory," more
realistically represents the employer's voluntary decision to sponsor a retirement plan by
placing that decision in its appropriate business context. To date, corporate governance
research has focused primarily on publicly traded corporations. This article expands the
basic premise of corporate governance theory--that legal structure influences manage-
ment behavior--to non-publicly traded businesses. My foundational theory answers two
fundamental questions essential to designing effective legislation for targeted pension
reform. First, what business-related factors will influence the employer's decision to
sponsor a retirement plan? Second, what business-related factors will influence which
employees are included and which employees are excluded from coverage under the
employer's retirement plan?
7. Like many other scholars, I do not attempt to define what constitutes an "adequate retirement income."
Commonly used standards vary from 60% to 100% of lost wages due to retirement. See Graetz, supra note 3,
at 856, note 9 (100%); Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the Problem of
Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LOYOLA L. REV. 1063, 1188 (1997) (80%); Jonathan
Barry Forman, Universal Pensions, 2 CHAPMAN L. REV. 95 (1999) (60%-80%). Because "success" in achiev-
ing an adequate retirement income is a difficult concept to define or measure, I instead focus in the article on
the one factor that may improve the income security of an individual's retirement--coverage under a private
retirement plan.
8. See discussion infra Part M.A.
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The targeted reform theory provides important insights for lawmakers interested in
achieving targeted pension reform. Employer size is only a rough surrogate for the legal
structure of the business entity. It is this legal structure and the resulting consequences
for both taxation of business profits and entity governance that influence the employer's
decision-making process for plan sponsorship and coverage design. Although all types
of employers exclude workers from retirement plan coverage, the reasons they do so,
and the methods they use, are not the same. Targeted pension reform legislation should
be crafted accordingly.
Employee demand for retirement plans, or the lack thereof, is an important factor in
the employer's voluntary decision to sponsor a retirement plan. Proposed legislation to
increase IRA contribution limits is likely to undermine the goal of targeted pension re-
form because it reduces employee demand for employer-sponsored retirement plans.
Similarly, proposed legislation to increase 401(k) salary deferral limits is likely to re-
duce employee demand for retirement plans requiring significant employer contribu-
tions. These insights are important ones for lawmakers to consider in fashioning targeted
pension reform legislation. The workers most at risk for inadequate retirement income--
lower-income workers--are those least able to afford to make contributions to an IRA or
401(k) plan. Lower-income workers will significantly improve their prospects for a
financially secure retirement only once their employers decide to move beyond an em-
ployee-funded 401(k) plan and sponsor an employer-funded retirement plan.
Part V of the article proposes two guiding principles for drafting targeted pension re-
form legislation. First, Congress should develop legislation that reforms the loopholes in
the pension tax system to broaden the scope of retirement plan coverage and benefits for
rank-and-file workers. Second, Congress should focus on obstacles to and incentives for
new plan sponsorship by employers that are the least susceptible to budgetary cycles.
Part V discusses each of these general principles and illustrates them with specific ex-
amples and suggestions for targeted pension reform legislation. The article concludes
with suggestions for completing a legislative agenda designed to achieve the objectives
of targeted pension reform.
II. THE BUDGET PROCESS AND PENSION TAX POLICY CYCLES
A. Who Lacks Pension Coverage?
Critics of the pension tax laws often cite the statistic that the voluntary retirement
plan system covers only 50% of the workforce.9 This criticism is somewhat misleading
9. See, e.g., Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester J. Schieber, Death and Taxes: Can We Fund for Retire-
ment Between Them?, in THE FUTURE OF PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 154 (Ray Schmidt ed. 1993);
Alicia H. Munnell, Are Pensions Worth the Cost?, NATIONAL TAX J. 393 (1991); Daniel I. Halperin, Special
Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It 'Still" Viable As a Means of Increasing Re-
tirement Income? 49 TAX L. REV 1, 4 (1993). On an aggregate basis the statistic is accurate. Although the
absolute number of workers with pension coverage has increased steadily over time, the number of workers
without pension coverage has grown at the same pace. See PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN No. 7, ABSTRACT OF 1994
FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS (Spring 1998) Graph E.3 at 95. As a result, no real progress has been made in
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because it masks important differences in coverage patterns both among employers and
among different types of workers.'0
As an initial observation, employers having fewer than 100 employees ("smaller em-
ployers")" are much less likely to sponsor a retirement plan. Only 31% of individuals
who work for smaller employers have a retirement plan. 2 In contrast, 85% of workers at
employers having 100 or more full-time employees ("larger employers") 3 have a retire-
ment plan available to them.'4 Not surprisingly, rates of participation in retirement plans
are substantially lower for smaller employers. Only 46% of full-time employees of
smaller employers participate in a retirement plan. 5 In contrast, 79% of full-time em-
ployees of larger employers participate in a retirement plan.16 Participation rates also are
markedly lower for part-time employees. Smaller employers offer retirement plan bene-
fits to only 13% of their part-time employees. 7 Larger employers provide retirement
plan benefits to 34% of their part-time employees. 8
Coverage rates for full-time and part-time employees also can be analyzed by the
different occupations of workers who are covered by retirement plans. Blue collar and
service employees, whether full-time or part-time, are much less likely to be offered
retirement plan benefits than professional, technical, clerical and sales employees. Table
reducing the "gap" in overall retirement plan coverage, despite numerous attempts at reform of the pension tax
laws. See discussion infra Part I C.
10. Another way to analyze private pension coverage is to study pension coverage from the life cycle per-
spective of the individual, rather than taking a "snapshot" of the workforce at a given point in time. See Good-
fellow & Schieber, supra note 9, in THE FUTURE OF PENSIONS at 154. Goodfellow and Schieber have used this
analytical approach and found that pension coverage rates increase steadily with age. See id. at 154-163. Even
using this ifecycle approach, they still found "disturbing" that a comparison of individuals of the same age in
1980 and 1990 showed a significant reduction in pension participation rates. See id. at 158-59.
11. Throughout the article, the term "smaller employer" will refer to an employer having fewer than 100
full-time employees, and the term "larger employer" to refer to an employer having 100 or more full-time
employees. My terminology corresponds to the categories used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") for
data collection concerning retirement plan sponsorship and coverage. The BLS has collected and published
data on employee benefits offered by private employers since 1979. The BLS surveys differentiate among
employers according to the number of employees. The BLS defines "small" employers as having fewer than
100 employees. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN SMALL PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS, 1996, iii (April 1999). [Hereinafter SMALL ESTABLISHMENTS]. The BLS defines medium
and large employers as having 100 or more employees. See id.
12. Employee BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, The 1999 Small Employer Retirement Survey: Building a
Better Mousetrap Is Not Enough, Issue Brief No. 212, 3 (August 1999).
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Small PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 11, table 1 at 5. The reported data are for 1996. For
401(k) plans with no employer contribution, coverage data include only those workers who are actually mak-
ing pre-tax contributions to the 401(k) plan. Id. at 80, note 35.
16. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private Establishments, 1997,
table 1 at 5 (Sept. 1999). The reported data are for 1997.
17. Small PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 11, table 96 at 102.
18. Medium AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 16, table 192 at 153. The Internal Reve-
nue Service has made clear that an employer cannot impose a "disguised" service condition for participants in
qualified retirement plans in excess of 1,000 hours of service by excluding groups of workers on the basis of
the employer's classification of them as "part-time" employees. See TAM 9508003; IRS Field Directive on
Exclusion of Part-Time Employees. Such a disguised service requirement violates Code Section 410(a). See
sources cited supra; Treas. Reg. § 1.410(a)-3(e), Example 3. For survey purposes the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics does not define "part-time employees," but rather uses each employer's own individual determination of
which of its workers are "part-time" employees. See notes of conversation with Anne Foster, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, National Compensation Survey (on file with the author).
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1 below summarizes coverage rates by size of employer, full-time or part-time status,
and occupation.
The general tendency of employers to exclude part-time and blue collar and service
employees from retirement plan coverage has obvious and serious implications for na-
tional retirement policy.2° A recent survey found that among persons who reported not
yet having begun saving for retirement, 31% cited as a major reason that their employer
did not offer them a retirement savings plan.2' Conversely, among persons who reported
having begun to save for retirement, 48% cited the availability of a plan at work as giv-
ing them "a lot" of motivation to save for retirement.22 The significantly lower plan
sponsorship and participation rates for smaller employers are particularly troublesome.
Smaller employers constitute ninety-eight percent (98%) of all employers in the United
States.23 They employed thirty-eight million persons, accounting for 38% of all em-
ployment.24
TABLE 119
20. With the possible exception of unionized workers, blue-collar and service workers are likely to have
lower career earnings, which translate into lower Social Security benefits and lower private savings rates.
Although Social Security benefits are disproportionately weighted toward low earnings workers when meas-
ured on a money's worth basis, in absolute dollars even the maximum monthly benefit is relatively meager.
See discussion infra notes 238 & 265.
21. Employee Benefits Research Institute, The Evolution of Retirement: Results of the 1999 Retirement
Confidence Survey, Issue Brief No. 216, 11 (Dec. 1999). Other major reasons were: having other savings
goals, such as a house or education (36%); expecting to have a pension (26%); lots of time remains until
retirement (24%); not knowing where to start (18%); and Social Security will take care of them (16%). By far,
however, the overwhelming major reason cited by non-savers (66%) was having too many current financial
responsibilities.
Significantly, many of the major reasons given for not saving are influenced, directly or indirectly, by the
employer's choice to sponsor a retirement plan. There is strong empirical evidence that where the employer
sponsors a retirement savings plan for workers, the educational materials that oftentimes accompany the plan
are effective in changing employee attitudes toward retirement savings and increasing retirement savings. See
The Evolution of Retirement, supra, at 15-16; Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Re-
tirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L. J. 1, 25 (2000).
22. The Evolution of Retirement, supra note 21, at 11. Other major factors motivating retirement savings
were: feeling they could not count on Social Security (53%); starting to earn enough money to save for retire-
ment (49%); having seen others not prepare and consequently struggle in retirement (48%); realizing time was
running out to prepare for retirement (39%); the advice of a financial professional (24%); and a family event,
such as marriage, birth of a child, or parents' retirement (21%). Id.
23. Employee Benefit Research Institute, supra note 12, at 3.
24. Id.
19. See SMALL PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 11, tables 1, 96 at 5, 102; MEDIUM AND LARGE
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 16, tables 1, 192 at 5, 153. The BLS survey defined the three occupa-
tional groups as follows. Professional and technical workers include professional, technical, executive, admin-
istrative, managerial, and related occupations. Clerical and sales workers include clerical, administrative
support, and sales occupations. Blue-collar and service workers include precision production, craft and repair
occupations, machine operators and inspectors, transportation and moving occupations, handlers, equipment
cleaners, helpers and laborers, and service occupations. SMALL PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, Appendix A:
Technical Note, at 104. The much higher rate of coverage among blue-collar and service workers of larger
employers is very likely attributable to higher rates of unionization, and thus participation in collectively
bargained multi-employer retirement plans, for this group. See 1994 FORM 5500 ANN. REP., supra note 9,
Tables B.3 at 16, B.4 at 17, and B.6 at 19.
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COVERAGE RATES BY OCCUPATION
Smaller Employers (fewer than 100 employees)
Professional/ Clerical/ Blue-Collar/
Technical Sales Service
Full-Time Workers 56% 53% 37%
Part-Time Workers 22% 24% 6%
Larger Employers (100 or more employees)
Professional/ Clerical/ Blue-Collar/
Technical Sales Service
Full-Time Workers 89% 81% 72%
Part-Time Workers 47% 40% 26%
Finally, the coverage data may mask potential gender and racial inequities in the
scope of private retirement plan coverage. Women and minority workers have a greater
tendency to be employed in smaller firms, to hold lower wage jobs, and to work less
than full-time. These factors, along with higher employment turnover rates, contribute to
lower pension coverage rates for women and minority workers.25
Who lacks pension coverage? To answer the question posed by this section, persons
without pension coverage can be broadly characterized as falling into two main groups.2 6
25. Goodfellow and Schieber characterize their findings concerning pension coverage rates for women as
optimistic because their data indicate that younger women, who are entering the workforce in greater numbers,
will have a corresponding increase in their rates of pension coverage. See Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester
J. Schieber, The Role of Tax Expenditures in the Provision of Retirement Income Security, in PENSIONS IN A
CHANGING ECONOMY, CHAP. 7, 89 (Richard V. Burkhauser & Dallas L. Salisbury, eds. 1993). Korczyk also
has analyzed pension coverage rates and found that women have made progress in obtaining pension coverage.
As a population, however, pension coverage rates for women still lag behind those for men. See Sophie M.
Korczyk, Gender Issues in Employer Pensions Policy, in PENSIONS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY, CHAP. 5, 59-
65. Snyder has analyzed pension coverage by race. See Donald C. Snyder, The Economic Well-Being of Re-
tired Workers by Race and Hispanic Origin, in PENSIONS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY, CHAP. 6, 67-78. Both
Korczyk and Snyder conclude that the tendencies of women and minority workers to be employed in smaller
firms, to have lower wage jobs, and to have higher turnover rates contribute to their overall lower rates of
pension coverage. See generally Employee Benefits Research Institute, Retirement Planning and Saving
Among Women: Results From the 1999 Women s Retirement Confidence Survey, 21 NOTES 1-6 (Jan. 2000);
The Evolution of Retirement, supra note 21, at 17-20 (discussing survey results for African-Americans, His-
panic-Americans, and Asian-Americans). For an analysis of gender bias in the pension tax laws and subse-
quent attempts at reform, see Camilla E. Watson, The Pension Game: Age and Gender-Based Inequities In the
Retirement System, 25 GA. L. REV. 1-69 (1990), and Dana M. Muir, From YUPPIES to GUPPIES: Unfunded
Mandates and Benefit Plan Regulation, 34 GEO. L. REV. 195, 215-223 (1999).
26. An argument could be made that "contingent workers" constitute a third group of persons with low
pension coverage rates. See Employee Benefits Research Institute, Contingent Workers and Workers In Alter-
native Work Arrangements, Issue Brief No. 207 (Mar. 1999) (defining contingent work as covering "flexible
employment practices such as temporary work, employee leasing, self-employment, contracting, and home-
based work, as well as part-time work.") I choose not to address this group for three reasons. First, persons in
contingent work arrangements constitute only a small percentage of the total workforce. See id. at 4. Second,
there is a large amount of overlap between part-time and low-income employees and the contingent and alter-
native work arrangement population. See id. at 3. Third, the problem of the misclassification of employees as
independent contractors and the legal characterization of leased employees in tripartite work arrangements
2001]
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One group consists of employees of smaller employers who do not sponsor retirement
plans for their workers. The other group consists of part-time and low-skilled workers
(collectively referred to in the remainder of this article as "low-income workers").2 7
B. Overview of the Tax Laws Governing Pension Coverage and Benefits
The single most distinguishing characteristic of the American retirement plan system
created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19748 ("ERISA") is that
plan sponsorship is voluntary among employers.29 Significant tax benefits are used to
motivate employers to sponsor retirement plans and to include rank-and-file workers in
those plans.3" To qualify for these tax benefits, the employer's retirement plan must be
designed to satisfy numerous technical requirements contained in Section 401(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code.3'
There are two main sets of rules that employers can use to exclude certain groups of
employees from participating in the employer's retirement plan. Eligibility rules govern
which employees the employer must treat as eligible to be included in the employer's
retirement plan. 32 Coverage rules (sometimes referred to as part of the nondiscrimina-
tion rules for qualified plans) 33 tell the employer how many individuals, among the pool
of otherwise eligible employees, the employer may exclude from coverage under the
plan." The eligibility and coverage rules, taken together, dictate how many of its work-
ers the employer can exclude from retirement plan coverage and still have the plan qual-
raises unique issues that are beyond the scope of this article. See Alvin D. Lurie, Microsoft Re-re-redux: New
Twist of the Eternal Triangle, TAX NOTES, 143-151 (July 5, 1999).
27. I have deliberately used the term "low-income workers" to describe this second group rather than the
Bureau of Labor Statistics nomenclature of "blue-collar and service employees." Other scholars too have found
the "low-income" classification useful, particularly when analyzing pension coverage and the associated distri-
bution among income groups of the pension tax expenditure. See, e.g., Sylvester Schieber & Gordon Goodfel-
low, Fat Cats, Bureaucrats, and Common Workers: Distributing the Pension Tax Preference Pie, in PENSION
FUNDING AND TAXATION, CHAP. VI, at 112-113 (Dallas L. Salisbury & Nora Super Jones, eds. 1994); Dallas
L. Salisbury, The Costs and*Benefits of Pension Tax Expenditures, in PENSION FUNDING & TAXATION, supra,
CHAP. V, at 94-95 and Table 5.7; Goodfellow & Schieber, supra note 25, at 92-93.
28. See Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 1 ("[Tihe committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary na-
ture of private retirement plans.").
30. See Staff Report of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Overview of Present-Law Tax Rules and Issues
Relating to Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans, Hearings Before the Subcommittee an Oversight of the
House Committee on Ways and Means, at 5 (March 22, 1999) In a qualified retirement plan, the employer
receives an immediate deduction for its contributions to the plan (including 401(k) plan salary deferral contri-
butions), within specified limits. The employee, however, is not taxed on this contribution and any earnings
thereon until the funds are distributed out of the plan. See Halperin, supra note 9 at 12-13. Contrary to popular
perception, for defined contribution and 401(k) plans the real economic advantage of this tax deferral for the
employee lies not in the deferral of immediate income taxation but rather in the employee's ability to earn a
pre-tax rate of return for a number of years prior to retirement. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 2 & note 4.
31. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
32. See I.R.C. § 410(a) (1994).
33. The other component of the nondiscrimination rules is Code Section 401(a)(4), which prohibits dis-
crimination in favor of highly-compensated employees in the contributions or benefits provided under the
plan. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-4.
34. See I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b).
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ify for preferential treatment under the pension tax law system.35 The employer is free,
of course, to design a plan that is more generous in the scope of its coverage--but few
employers choose to do so.
36
1. Eligibility Rules
The employer can treat an employee as ineligible for the employer's retirement plari
until the employee has satisfied two eligibility criteria. First, the plan can be designed so
that all employees under the age of 21 are ineligible.37 Second, the plan can be designed
so that a new or rehired employee is ineligible to participate in the plan until he has
completed one year of service.38
For transient workers who participate in defined contribution plans, the one year of
service rule can greatly reduce their retirement savings.39 This reduction is particularly
acute for participants in 401(k) plans.' For example, a 22-year-old who contributes
$4,000 each year to a 401(k) plan until age 62 will have accumulated $1.1 million in
retirement savings, assuming an eight percent annual rate of return.4 But if that worker
changes jobs seven times during the course of her career and must sit out a year each
time before becoming eligible to participate in the employer's 401(k) plan, she will have
accumulated just $534,000 in her retirement savings account by age 62.42 The differ-
ence, much more than the $28,000 in lost contributions, is attributable to the lost eco-
nomic benefit of pre-tax compounding of earnings inside the plan.43
Most employers require some minimum service period before a new or rehired em-
ployee becomes eligible to participate in the employer's retirement plan." The average
length of service requirement for 401(k) plans is over ten months.45 Similarly long ser-
vice periods apply to other types of defined contribution plans.' Many employers re-
35. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(3) (1994).
36. See discussion supra Part I.A.
37. I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A)(i) (1994). This ineligibility period can be extended to age 26 for employees of
educational institutions. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(l)(B)(ii) (1994).
38. I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1994). A year of service is defined as 1,000 hours of service completed dur-
ing the 12-month period beginning with the employee's employment commencement date. I.R.C. §
410(a)(3)(A) (1994). Special rules apply to seasonal and maritime industries. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(3)(B),(D)
(1994). An employer can extend the one year of service requirement to up to two years if the employee be-
comes 100% vested upon entering the plan. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
39The one year of service rule does not delay the time for vesting. See I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(4) (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998). It is therefore less detrimental to participants in defined benefit plans.
40. The growing importance of defined contribution plans in general, and 401(k) plans in particular, is
well-documented. See Medill, supra note 21, at 7-9. In 1995, 401(k) plan contributions accounted for 55% of
all contributions to employer-sponsored retirement plans. See Stretching the Pension Dollar: Improving U.S.
Retirement Security and National Savings by Enhancing Employer-Based Pensions, (Watson Wyatt World-
wide, Research and Information Center , Aug. 1999, at 9) (prepared for the American Council for Capital
Formation and the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans).
41. Jeannie Mandelker, Empowered Employees, CFO MAG., 74 (April 1999).
42. See Id.
43. See discussion and sources cited supra note 30.
44. See SMALL PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 11, tables 84 and 86 at 85, 86; MEDIUM AND
LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 16, Tables 168, 173, and 176 at 130, 132 and 134.
45. See SMALL PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 11, Table 86 at 86; MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 16, Table 176 at 134.
46. See SMALL PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note !1, Table 84 at 85; MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 16, Tables 168 and 173 at 130 and 132.
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quire the maximum one year of service for plan eligibility.47
2. Coverage Rules
The coverage rules are contained in Section 410(b) of the Internal Revenue Code,48
and further elaborated in Treasury Department Regulations.49 The purpose of the cover-
age rules "is to ensure that qualified plans benefit an employer's rank-and-file employees
as well as highly compensated employees."5" Several compliance options are available to
employers." All of these options are calculated using only the pool of eligible employ-
ees who already have satisfied the plan's eligibility rules. 2
The simplest option is known as the ratio percentage test.53 Under the ratio percent-
age test, the employer's plan satisfies the minimum coverage requirement if the plan
benefits a percentage of "non-highly compensated employees"54 that is at least 70% of
the percentage of "highly compensated employees"55 benefiting under the plan. 6 Exam-
ple I below illustrates how the ratio percentage test works, and the interplay between the
eligibility and coverage rules.
Example 1
A business has a total of 11 employees, consisting of one highly compensated em-
ployee (the owner), and 10 non-highly compensated employees. Eight of the 10 non-
highly compensated employees are salaried computer programmers; two are hourly
office personnel. All 11 employees have satisfied the plan's eligibility rules (age 21 with
one year of service).
47. See sources cited supra notes 44-46. A 1999 survey by the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America,
limited to its member companies, found that although the most frequent eligibility period for 401(k) and profit-
sharing plans still was one year, there was a trend toward more immediate eligibility. See Profit Shar-
ing/401(k) Council of America, 401(k) and Profit Sharing Plan Eligibility Survey (Dec. 1999) available at
<http://www.psca.org>.
48. See I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994).
49. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b) (as amended in 1994).
50. Overview of Present-Law Tax Rules, supra note 30, at 2.
51. See LR.C. § 410(b) (1994).
52. See Overview of Present-Law Tax Rules, supra note 30, at 8. Union employees are excluded from the
pool of eligible employees if retirement benefits were the subject of good faith bargaining between the em-
ployer and the union. See I.R.C. § 410(b)(3)(A) (1994).
53. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1994). For numerical illustrations of the ratio per-
centage test, the reader may refer to the examples found in the Treasury Department Regulations, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.410(b)-2(b)(2)(ii), and in JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW,
284 (3RD ED. 2000).
54. A non-highly compensated employee is any employee who is not a highly compensated employee.
See infra note 55.
55. A highly compensated employee is any employee who was a 5% owner of the employer during the
current or preceding year, or who for the preceding year had compensation in excess of $80,000 (indexed) and,
if the employer so elects, was in the top 20% of all employees ranked by compensation. See I.R.C. §
4 14(q)(l)-(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For 2000 the indexed income limit was $85,000. See source cited infra
note 150.
56. See Overview of Present-Law Ta Rules, supra note 30, at 9. For 401(k) plans, an employee is
treated for coverage purposes as "benefitting" under the 401(k) plan if the employee is eligible to make elec-
tive salary deferrals, whether or not the employee actually does so. See I.R.C. § 410(b)(6)(E) (1994).
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The owner designs the plan to cover all salaried employees and exclude from cover-
age all hourly employees (thereby including the salaried computer programmers and
excluding the hourly office personnel). The plan covers 100% (1/1 HCEs) of the highly
compensated employees. Under the ratio percentage test it must cover 70% (100% x
70%) of the non-highly compensated employees. The plan covers 80% (8/10 non-HCEs)
of the non-highly compensated employees. It easily passes the ratio percentage test.
What happens if the employer adds another hourly employee? For the first year after
the new hourly employer is hired, she is ineligible to participate in the employer's plan.
Thus the employer's coverage percentage of non-highly compensated employees re-
mains unchanged at 80%. Once the new hourly employee has satisfied the plan's one
year of service requirement; however, the plan's coverage percentage of non-highly
compensated employees decreases to 72.7% (8/11 non-HCEs).
What happens if two of the computer programmers terminate employment? The em-
ployer's plan now fails the ratio percentage test. Even if two new computer programmers
are hired, they will not be eligible for the plan until they have completed a year of ser-
vice. During that year, the plan will cover only 66% (6/9) of the employer's non-highly
compensated employees.
Contrast the example of this very small employer with Example 2 of the much larger
employer below:
Example 2
A business has a total of 1,010 employees, consisting of ten highly compensated
employees and 1,000 non-highly compensated employees. Of the 1,000 non-highly
compensated employees, 600 are salaried workers and 400 are hourly workers. All
1,010 employees have satisfied the plan's eligibility rules (age 21 with one year of ser-
vice).
Seven of the ten of the highly compensated employees are covered by the plan.57 Of
the non-highly compensated employees, the plan covers only the 600 salaried employees
and excludes the 400 hourly employees. Does this plan pass the ratio percentage test?
Yes. Seventy percent (7/10) of the employer's highly compensated employees benefit
under the plan. Therefore, the plan must benefit 49% (70% x 70%) of the employer's
non-highly compensated employees. This plan benefits 60% (600/1000) of the em-
ployer's non-highly compensated employees, and therefore passes the ratio percentage
test.
My examples illustrate for the reader the dynamics of the ratio percentage test. The
retirement plans of smaller employers tend to be more sensitive to employee turnover.
Retirement plans sponsored by larger employers are less vulnerable to employee turn-
over among the ranks of non-highly compensated employees. In addition, larger em-
ployers can further reduce the number of non-highly compensated employees that must
benefit under the plan by excluding some management executives and offering to them
57. The employer may prefer to give these three highly compensated employees a more lucrative
nonqualified deferred compensation plan ("nonqualified plan") instead of allowing them to participate in the
employer's retirement plan. Because payment of benefits from a nonqualified plan depends on the continued
financial solvency of the employer, such plans are often more attractive to employees of larger and more
established employers. See generally Halperin, supra note 9, at 24-27.
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instead alternative compensation arrangements."
The second, more complex option an employer may use to satisfy the coverage rules
is the average benefits test.59 Under the average benefits test, the employer's plan must
satisfy two criteria. First, the plan's method for classifying who is a covered employee
cannot discriminate in favor of highly-compensated employees ("nondiscriminatory
classification test").' This component of the average benefits test addresses the coverage
percentage of non-highly compensated employees.6 Second, the average benefit per-
centage for all non-highly compensated employees of the employer must be at least 70%
of the average benefit percentage for all highly-compensated employees of the employer
("average benefit percentage test").62 Under the average benefits test, the employer's
plan can satisfy the minimum coverage requirement of Code Section 410(b) with a
much lower coverage rate for non-highly compensated employees than under the ratio
percentage test.63 Example 3 below illustrates the difference in scope of coverage that is
possible between the ratio percentage test and the average benefits test.
Example 3
A business has a total of 1010 employees, consisting of 10 highly compensated em-
ployees and 1000 non-highly compensated employees. Of the 1000 non-highly compen-
sated employees, 200 are salaried and 800 are hourly employees. All 1010 employees
have satisfied the plan's eligibility requirements (age 21 with one year of service). The
plan covers only salaried employees. Seven of the ten highly compensated employees
(all salaried employees) are covered by the plan. Of the 1000 non-highly compensated
employees, the 200 salaried employees are included in the plan and the 800 hourly em-
ployees are excluded from participation. The plan's ratio percentage is only 28.5%. 6
58. See discussion supra note 57 and accompanying text.
59. See LR.C. § 410(b)(2) (1994). For numerical illustrations of the average benefits test, the reader may
refer to the examples found in Treasury Department Regulations, Treas. Reg. 1.410(b)-4 and 1.410(b)-5, and
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 53, at 284-86.
60. Overview of Present-Law Tax Rules, supra note 30, at 8; see Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4.
(nondiscriminatory classification component of average benefits test).
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4.
62. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-5 (average benefit percentage component of average benefits test). These
average benefit percentages are calculated using all employees of the employer, whether or not they are cov-
ered by a plan. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Nondiscrimination in Employee Benefits: False Starts and Future
Trends, 52 TENN. L REV. 167 (1985), reprinted in PETER J. WIEDENBECK & RUSSELL K. OSGOOD, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, 212 (1996).
63. See DAN M. MCGILL, ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS, 69 (7th Ed. 1996). In general,
the greater the percentage of non-highly compensated employees in the employer's workforce, the easier it is
for the employer to pass the nondiscriminatory classification component of the average benefits test. See
McGiL, supra, at 69. Typically a plan using the average benefits test will have more difficulty passing the
average benefit percentage component than the nondiscriminatory classification component of the test. See
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 53, at 285-86 (describing employer's options for passing the average benefit
percentage component of the average benefits test). See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4.
64. For the reader who wants to do the math, the plan's ratio percentage is calculated by dividing the cov-
erage percentage of the non-highly compensated employees by the coverage percentage of the highly compen-
sated employees. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4(c)(5), Example 1. In my example, the non-highly compensated
coverage percentage is 20% (200/1000) and the highly compensated employee coverage percentage is 70%
(7/10). This results in a ratio percentage of 28.5% (20%/70%).
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Under the nondiscriminatory classification component of the average benefits test, this
plan comfortably passes by a margin of almost 8%.65
Employers with a division or subsidiary having at least 50 employees can use a spe-
cial-purpose rule known as the separate line of business (SLOB) test.66 The separate line
of business test can be used to satisfy the Code Section 410(b) minimum coverage re-
quirement when the employer offers a separate qualified plan limited to the employees
of a separate subsidiary or division ("SLOB entity"). The SLOB entity must satisfy a
complex set of criteria defined by regulation. 67 The traditional policy justification for the
SLOB exception is that the exemption is necessary to preserve flexibility and competi-
tiveness for larger employers with multiple lines of business. 6 These larger employers
otherwise may not be able to compete with other employers in a single line of business
where the industry practice is not to sponsor a retirement plan for their workers. 69 The
regulatory requirements of the SLOB test, however, do not require a showing of com-
petitive need justifying a separate plan for the subsidiary or divisional group.7"
Both the average benefits and SLOB tests are much more complex for the employer
to implement and administer, oftentimes requiring the assistance of highly skilled pen-
sion tax law experts. The advantage to the employer of using these more complex tests
is calculated in terms of dollars saved from excluding even more employees from the
plan coverage than would be possible under the ratio percentage test. Consequently,
these tests tend to be most popular among larger employers who will generate signifi-
cant cost savings if they can exclude large numbers of employees from coverage under a
generous company retirement plan.
3. Limitation Rules
Current legislative proposals to reform the pension tax laws, discussed in Part II, do
not focus on amending the eligibility and coverage requirements for qualified retirement
plans.7 Instead, these proposals would increase the maximum limitations for deductions,
contributions and benefits from qualified retirement plans (collectively, the limitation
rules).72 In addition, these proposals would increase the maximum contribution limits for
deductible73 and so-called "Roth"74 individual retirement accounts ("IRAs").
The underlying purpose of the limitation rules for qualified plans is simple--to limit
the amount of the tax subsidy for qualified retirement plans. In 2000, for defined contri-
bution plans the maximum amount that could be deducted annually by the employer for
65. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4(c) (as amended in 1991). In my example, the non-highly compensated
employee concentration percentage is 99% (1000 non-highly compensated employees/1010 total employees).
At this level the plan's safe harbor ratio percentage is 20.75%. See id. Of course, the plan will not be qualified
unless it also can pass the average benefit percentage component of the average benefits test. See Treas. Reg. §
1.4 10(b)-5; see sources cited supra notes 62-63.
66. I.R.C. §§ 410(b)(5) (1994); 414(r) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
67. See Treas. Reg. § 1.414(r).
68. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 53, at 301; Halperin, supra note 9, at 39-40.
69. See LANGBEtN & WOLK, supra note 53, at 301.
70. See Treas. Reg. § 1.414(r) (as amended in 1994).
71. See discussion infra Part I.A.
72. See I.R.C. § 404(a) (West 1999); I.R.C. § 415 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
73. See I.R.C. § 408(a) (1994).
74. See id.
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each participant was the lesser of 25% of compensation (calculated on a maximum base
compensation amount of $170,000)" 5 or $30,000.76 The maximum limit in 2000 for sal-
ary deferral contributions to a 401(k) plan was $10,500. 7 7 For defined benefit plans, the
limit on the annual benefit payable to each participant was the lesser of 100% of average
compensation or $130,000.78 Beginning in 2000 there is no longer an overall combined
limit for participants in both defined contribution and defined benefit plans.79
The maximum annual contribution limit in 2000 for both traditional and Roth IRAs
was $2,000.80 The difference between the two types of IRAs lies in the income tax
treatment of contributions and withdrawals. Contributions to traditional IRAs are de-
ductible by individuals; contributions to Roth IRAs are not.8' Contributions and invest-
ment earnings from traditional IRAs are includible in the individual's gross income
when withdrawn. Withdrawals of contributions and investment earnings from Roth
IRAs generally are not subject to federal income tax.82
C. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and Its Effect on Pension Tax Policy
Congress enacted both the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act83
("Budget Act") and ERISA in 1974. It is ironic indeed that the purposes and objectives
of these two laws have become so entangled.
1. The Role of the Tax Expenditure Concept in the Budget Process
Many scholars have criticized how the changes to the appropriations process initi-
ated by the Budget Act have changed the way Congress makes tax policy. 84 Although
75. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 404(a)(7) (1994). For figures for 2000 adjusted for
inflation, see source cited infra note 150.
76. See OVERVIEW OF PRESENT-LAW TAx RULEs, supra note 30, at 13; Carl Goldfield, Employee Plans--
Deductions, Contributions and Funding, 371-3rd TAx MGMT. PORT, A-84, A-92 (1996). The $30,000 limita-
tion amount is not indexed for inflation.
77. See source cited infra note 150. Under the special nondiscrimination rules applicable to 401(k) plans,
highly compensated employees may not be able to defer the maximum amount. See OVERVIEW OF PRESENT-
LAW TAx RULES, supra note 30, at 12 (describing the actual deferral percentage ("ADP") test). For SIMPLE
401(k) plans, described infra Part I.C., the maximum deferral amount is $6,000. See § 408(p)(2)(A)(ii) (1994
& Supp. IV 1998). Highly compensated employees in SIMPLE 401(k) plans and so-called "safe harbor"
401(k) plans with specified levels of employer matching contributions are exempt from ADP testing and
therefore may defer the maximum amount allowed by law. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(1 1)-(12) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
78. See Overview OF PRESENT-LAW TA RULES, supra note 30, at 14.
79. Id.
80. I.R.C. §§ 408(a)(1) (1994) (traditional IRAs); 408A(a) (Supp. IV 1998) (Roth IRAs). An individual
can contribute to both a traditional IRA and a Roth IRA, but the aggregate total of his annual contributions
cannot exceed $2,000. See I.R.C. § 408A(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Income limits restrict eligibility for both
deductible and Roth IRAs.
81. Compare I.R.C. § 219(b), (g) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) with § 408A(c)(1).
82. Compare I.R.C. § 408(d)(1) with § 408A(d)(l)(a).
83. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297.
84. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609-682 (1995);
Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complication, 45 TAX L. REV. 25-95
(1989); Michael A. Livingston, Re-Inventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal
Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 389 (1998) ("tax policy as a whole has increasingly become a subdivision
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the details of the laws governing today's budget process are complex,85 the basic idea is
simple. Congress sets budgetary targets for revenues and spending.86 Budgets also are
estimated for various "tax expenditures,1 7 the catch-all term for tax revenues that are
"lost" to the fisc due to preferential tax treatment of certain economic activities under the
Internal Revenue Code.8 If Congress increases spending in one area, it must either cut
an equivalent amount of spending from somewhere else in the budget, or increase tax
revenues. Conversely, if Congress wants to cut taxes, it must either reduce spending by
a corresponding amount or increase tax revenues in another area so that the overall
budgetary effect of tax reforms is "revenue-neutral." 89 In either instance, the list of esti-
mated tax expenditures becomes the prime "hit list" for lawmakers looking for ways to
finance proposed legislation.9°
of broader budgetary politics..."); but see Sheldon D. Pollack, A New Dynamics of Tax Policy?, 12 AM. J.
TAX POL. 61 (1995) (attributing the "erratic and unusual pattern" of tax policy in the 1980s to structural
changes in the American political system).
Graetz examines in detail how lawmakers use and rely upon the fiscal estimates required under today's
budget appropriations process. Graetz strongly criticizes the current system because it focuses lawmakers on
numerical revenue and expenditure estimates rather than the more important tax policy issues of distributional
equity and long-term economic effects. See Graetz, supra, at 612-13. He concludes that "current practices of
relying solely on five-or-ten-year annual revenue estimates and of fashioning tax legislation to achieve a
particular result in a distribution table create an illusion of precision when such precision is impossible." See
id. at 613.
85. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (commonly known as "Gramm-
Rudman"), Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, refined the Budget Act's new appropriations process. The
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (Title XM of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990), revised the Gramm-Rudman procedures and imposed statutory caps on budget
authority and outlays. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312,
extended the caps through 1998. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, up-
dated and extended the caps through 2002.
86. See 2 U.S.C. § 632; Graetz, supra note 84, at 611-12; McLure, supra note 84, at 32-33.
87. See 2 U.S.C. § 632(e)(6); McLure, supra note 84, at 32.
88. Section 3 of the Budget Act defines the term "tax expenditures" as "those revenue losses attributable
to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross
income, or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability." 2 U.S.C. §
622(3).
Tax scholars have long debated the appropriate definition and scope of tax expenditures. See, e.g., Boris I.
Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax"Base as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REV. 925-85 (1967);
Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244-61
(1967); Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget--Response to Professor
Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528-37 (1969); Boris I. Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget--A Reply to Professors
Surrey & Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538-41 (1969); Livingston, supra note 84, at 375-76. In particular, schol-
ars have debated whether the tax preferences for retirement plans should be abhorred as a pejorative deviation
from the normative Haig-Simons income tax base, or applauded as consistent with a consumption-based
income tax. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status
Quo, 66 N.C. L. REV. 315-65 (1988); Norman P. Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A Reply to
Professor Zelinsky, 9 AM. J. TAX POLICY 225-56 (1991); Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and Identifying
Tax Expenditures: A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AM. J. TAX POLICY 257-82 (1991); Joseph Bankman, Tax
Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 790, 831 & note 146 (1988). But see James A. Wooten, The 'Original Intent"of the Federal Tax Treat-
ment of Private Pension Plans, 85 TAX NOTES 1305-9 (1999). In this article I wish to avoid this theoretical
debate concerning whether the preferential tax treatment for retirement plans is properly classified as a tax
expenditure and simply treat it as such, because this is how lawmakers treat it for budgetary purposes.
89. See McLure, supra note 84, at 38-41; 81-82. Academics recognize this situation as creating a "zero-
sum game." See id. at 39, but ,see Pollock, supra note 84, at 91-94 (disagreeing with characterization of tax
policy making process under balanced budget constraints as a zero-sum game).
90. See McLure, supra note 84, at 33, note 21.
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The subsidy for retirement plans sits atop the tax expenditure list.91 The sheer magni-
tude of the subsidy for retirement plans makes it highly susceptible to "reform" amend-
ments designed to reduce the tax expenditure and thereby increase tax revenues.92 The
estimated tax expenditure for retirement plans for 2000 was $78.3 billion.93 By way of
comparison, the second and third largest tax expenditures for that year were for em-
ployer-provided health and long-term care insurance ($61.3 billion) and the home mort-
gage interest deduction ($50.4 billion).' 4
Congress has not consciously undermined the private retirement plan system. But
many experts have argued that the almost annual passage of pension tax legislation in
the 1980s and early 1990s, designed to reduce the pension tax expenditure and meet
overall budget deficit reduction targets, has had this effect.95
91. See Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 105th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for
Fiscal Years 1999-2003, at 15-24, Table I (Joint Comm. Print. 1998).
92. See Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration, and
the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV. 435, 441 (Spring 1987); Goodfellow & Schieber, supra note
25, at 79-81.
93. Estimates OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES, 1999-2003, supra note 91, table 1. The tax expenditures
for IRAs ($12.4 billion) and Keogh plans for self-employed individuals ($5.1 billion) were comparably insig-
nificant. See id. There is a popular misconception, perpetuated by lawmakers, that the entire amount of the
pension tax expenditure goes toward subsidizing private employer-sponsored retirement plans. See EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, 440 (5th ED. 1997). In
fact, slightly more of the pension tax expenditure is allocated to public sector retirement plans (54%) than is
allocated to private sector retirement plans (46%). See id. at 439 (estimates using 1996 data).
The magnitude of the pension tax expenditure has prompted many scholars to question whether, as a mat-
ter of public policy, this subsidy can be justified. These criticisms fall into two main categories. First, some
question the pension tax expenditure on equitable distribution grounds, arguing that the benefits of the subsidy
are skewed in favor of high income taxpayers. See, e.g., Alicia H. Munnell, Are Pensions Worth the Cost?,
NAT'L TAX J. 393-404 (Sept. 1991); Concurrent Resolution on the Budget For Fiscal Year 1994: Hearings
Before the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, 103d Cong., 1Vt Sess. 344 (1993) (statement of Dr.
Jane G. Gravelle, policy analyst); Graetz, supra note 3, at 678-79. More recent analysis, however, indicates
that one effect of the pension tax law reforms in the 1980s was a more equitable distribution of the pension tax
expenditure among income classes. See discussion infra Part U.B. 1.
Joseph Bankman has questioned the economic utility of the coverage rules, which "force" rank-and-file
employees to save for retirement by requiring their employer to include them in the employer's qualified plan.
See Joseph Bankman, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination Provisions on Rank-and-File Compensation, 72
WASH. U. L. REV. 597-618; Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-
Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 790, 805-814 (1988). Writing in 1988, Bankman
acknowledged that the pension tax expenditure may be justifiable on social policy grounds, particularly if
rank-and-file employees are shown to be incapable of rational economic behavior. See Bankman, supra, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. at 814-21; see also Stein, supra note 88, at 227, note 10. Today there is highly persuasive empiri-
cal research indicating that the subsidy for retirement plans is justifiable on paternalistic grounds. Many em-
ployees lack the knowledge and ability to competently plan and prepare for their own retirement. See Medill,
supra note 21, at 14-17.
94. Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures, 1999-2003, supra note 91, at table 1.
95. See, e.g., Overview of Present-Law Tax Rules, supra note 30, at 16-17; Thomas Paine, Appraising
Public Policy for Private Retirement Plans, in PENSION FUNDING & TAXATION, supra note 29, 1-2; Stretching
the Pension Dollar, supra note 40, at i. Goodfellow and Schieber compared the pension coverage rates among
workers of the same age for 1980 and 1990. They found that the scope of pension coverage had declined,
despite a steady stream of pension reform legislation during this period. See Goodfellow & Schieber, supra
note 25, at 83. The frustration of pension tax law experts who must implement these annual "reforms" is de-
scribed by Robert E. Helm and Brian P. Goldstein in their article, Pension Reform/Simplification--An Urgent
Need: Practical Proposals From the Front Lines, 25 GA. L. REV. 91-116 (1990).
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2. The Pension Law Deficit Cycle: 1982 - 1995
Faced with large budget deficits, in 1982 Congress began a pattern of "reforming" the
pension tax laws and the tax laws governing IRAs to curtail the associated tax subsidy.96
As illustrated by Table 2 below, in every instance these reforms were estimated to in-
crease federal tax revenues.
A general discussion of these amendments to the pension laws follows. 12 My main
point, however, is illustrated by Table 2. The pension law "reforms" enacted by Con-
gress during the deficit cycle were, in fact, well-disguised tax increases. The intricacies
of the tax laws governing retirement plans made these tax increases virtually indiscerni-
ble, and thus invisible, to all but the most sophisticated taxpayers." 3 The discussion
below describes the general techniques Congress used during the deficit cycle to raise
tax revenues by reducing the pension tax subsidy. These techniques reappear in Part II,
where I review proposed legislation to "reform" the pension tax laws once again, this
time in the context of a substantial budget surplus.
3. Deficit Cycle Reform Techniques
The most common revenue raising technique used during the deficit cycle was to re-
duce the maximum amounts for employer contributions and deductions for retirement
plans. TEFRA lowered the annual benefit payable from a defined benefit plan to
$90,000, and lowered the annual contribution limit for participants in defined contribu-
tion plans to $30,000."4 In 1987, OBRA made numerous changes to the highly technical
rules for employer funding of defined benefit plans. The end result was to reduce sig-
nificantly the amount of the employer's deduction for contributions to a defined benefit
plan, in part by limiting deductible contributions to an amount necessary to fund the
plan at 150% of current liabilities." 5 In like fashion, the TRA of 1986 greatly restricted
96. See Salisbury, supra note 27, at 86. For a description of the tax treatment of private pensions prior to
the enactment of ERISA, see Wooten, supra note 88; Dilley, supra note 7, at 1142-1167 (tax treatment of
plans integrated for Social Security Benefits); see generally Richard L. Hubbard, The Tax Treatment of Pen-
sions, in PENSION FUNDING & TAXATION, supra note 27, at 43-44; Salisbury, supra note 27, at 86-87.
112. The reader interested in a more detailed description than the one provided in this article of the legis-
lative acts listed in Table 2 may consult Paul Yakoboski's summary contained in Overview of the U.S. Em-
ployment-Based Retirement Income System, EBRI-ERF Policy Forum (Dec. 1, 1999) at pages 16-18 (visited
Oct. 3, 2000) <www.ebri.org>.
113. As the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has itself stated, "The Federal laws and regulations
governing employer-provided retirement benefits are recognized as among the most complex set of rules
applicable to any area of the tax law." OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT-LAW TAX RULES, supra note 30, at 21. My
main point is further illustrated by the observations of both lawmakers and scholars that the historic reduction
in personal income tax rates achieved by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was, in fact, "paid for" in part by the
equally historic elimination or decrease of many of the tax preferences previously given to pension plans and
IRAs. See Goodfellow & Schieber, supra note 25, at 80-81; Targeted Incentives to Increase Personal Savings:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 104th Cong., 25 (1995) (Statement of Senator D'Amato).
114. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 235, 96 Stat. at 505. The $90,000 benefit payable limit for defined
benefit plans was indexed for inflation; the $30,000 limit for defined contribution plans was not. TEFRA also
lowered the combined limits of Code 415(e) for participants in both defined benefit and defined contribution
plans. See id. Congress has since repealed Code 415(e). See OVERVIEW OF PRESENT-LAW TAX RULES, supra
note 30, at 12.
115. OBRA, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 9301, 101 Stat. 1330-331. It is the changes made by OBRA, more
than any other, that advocates for defined benefit plans point to as responsible for the decline in popularity of
defined benefit plans among employers. See Stretching the Pension Dollar, supra note 40, at 3-8; Michael J.
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the availability of a tax deduction for IRA contributions to persons who also participated
in a qualified plan."6 The TRA of 1986 also reduced the maximum annual amount for
elective salary deferrals under a 401(k) plan to $7,000.117
A second technique used by Congress was to "cap" the amount of compensation the
plan may consider in determining a participant's level of accrued benefits or pro rata
share of employer contributions to the plan." 8 The TRA of 1986 initially set a cap on
compensation at $200,000."9 In 1993, OBRA reduced the cap on compensation to
$150,000. 120
Gulotta, Changing Private Pension Funding Rules and Benefit Security, in PENSION FUNDING & TAXATION,
supra note 27, at 119, 122. Both the Stretching the Pension Dollar study and Gulotta provide a complete dis-
cussion of the numerous technical changes OBRA made to the minimum funding rules for defined benefit
plans.
116. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1101, 100 Stat. at 2416.
117. Id. § 1105, 100 Stat. at 2472. This $7000 limit was indexed for inflation.
118. Defined contribution plans (other than 401(k) plans) commonly allocate employer contributions pro
rata based on plan compensation because this type of plan design is a safe harbor for compliance with Code
Section 401(a)(4). See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1993).
119. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1106(d), 100 Stat. at 2423. This $200,000 compensation cap was in-
dexed for inflation.
120. OBRA, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13212, 107 Stat. at 471. This $150,000 compensation cap was in-
dexed for inflation. See § 401(a)(17)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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Table 2
THE DEFICIT CYCLE
Law Estimated Tax Revenue Increase
TEFRA (1982) 9' $3,872,000,000 (1983-1987)98
DEFRA (1984) 99  $320,000,000 (1986-1989) o
TRA (1986)'0' $44,442,000,000 (1987-1991)12
OBRA (1987)103 $3,875,000,000 (1988-1990)10 4
TAMRA (1988)'1°  $16,000,000 (1988-1990)'06
UCA (1992)107 See note 107
OBRA (1993)'08 $2,383,000,000 (1994-1998)'0 9
URAA (1994) "0 $395,000,000 (1995-1999) 1"
97. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
98. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-760, Table 2, 693, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1190, 1456.
99. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
100. H.R. REP. No. 98-434, Part II, Table IV-2, 1101, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 776.
101. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
102. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-841, Table A.1, 11-861, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4949. Of
this total, over half ($23,774 million) was attributable to increased limitations on deductible IRAs. See id. at 11-
876, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4964.
103. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330.
104. H.R. REP. No. 100-391 (lH), Table 2, 1640, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-1220.
105. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342.
106. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Comparison of the Revenue Impact of H.R. 4333, Technical Cor-
rections Act of 1988, As Passed By the House of Representatives and As Passed By the Senate, 6 (JCX-31-88,
Oct. 12, 1988).
107. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-318, 100 Stat. 290. Although
the author was unable to find in the public records numerical revenue estimates for the changes to the direct
rollover rules enacted by the UCA, it is clear from the legislative history that these amendments were part of
the "financing provisions" necessary to pay for the primary purpose of the bill--to extend unemployment
compensation benefits. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-650, 41-44, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 255, 265-
268 (listing changes to the direct rollover rules under the "Financing Provisions").
108. Otnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
109. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, 813, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 1043.
110. Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Sta. 4809.
111. H.R. REP. No. 103-826 (I), 236, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 4008.
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Table 3 below illustrates the consequences of imposing a cap on compensation for
purposes of allocating an employer's contribution to a profit sharing plan. The table
assumes the plan allocates a $50,000 employer contribution to the plan pro rata to plan
participants based on their compensation.
Table 3
COMPENSATION CAP EFFECTS
Actual Allocation Allocation
Employee Compensation Pre-OBRA Post-OBRA"'
1 $225,000 $28,125 $23,077
2 $75,000 $9,375 $11,538
3 $40,000 $5,000 $6,154
4 $35,000 $4,375 $5,385
5 $25,000 $3,125 $3,846
Total $400,000 $50,000 $50,000
Table 3 illustrates the two effects of imposing a cap on participant compensation in
the context of a profit sharing plan. The revenue effect is to reduce the tax-favored plan
benefits for higher income tax bracket participants with earnings above the cap. 22 The
distributional effect is to increase the amount of plan benefits to participants who earn
less than the cap amount.
23
A third technique involved the creation of a special nondiscrimination rule for
401(k) plans. 2 4 This special rule, known as the actual deferral percentage (ADP) test, 
25
limits the amount of elective salary deferrals for highly compensated employees by
"linking" the level of their salary deferrals to the levels achieved by non-highly compen-
sated employers under the plan. 26 Application of these special nondiscrimination rules
121. Although Employee 1 has actual compensation of $225,000, for purposes of allocating employer
contributions, his compensation is capped at $150,000. As a result, Employee I's pro rata share of the $50,000
employer contribution is reduced from 56.25% ($225,000/$400,000) to 46.15% ($150,000/$325,000). The pro
rata shares of Employees 2-5 are correspondingly increased.
122. See Bankman, supra note 93, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. at 835 (advocating for direct limitations on pen-
sion-related tax benefits to highly compensated employees); Fiona E. Liston & Adrien R. LaBombarde, De-
creasing the Compensation Cap for Pensions: Consequences for National Retirement Policy, in PENSION
FUNDING & TAXATION, supra note 27, at 131, 132-133 (describing with examples the decrease in benefits or
contributions for participants whose compensation exceeds the $150,000 cap).
123. See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, 650 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 881 (justifying
OBRA '93's reduction of the compensation amount as strengthening the nondiscrimination rules).
124. See DEFRA, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 527, 98 Stat. at 875; TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1116-1117,
100 Stat. at 2454-63.
125. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(3)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(b)(2) (as amended
in 1991).
126. The ADP test limits elective salary deferrals (determined as a percentage of compensation) for
highly compensated employees to a multiple of the corresponding deferrals (again determined as a percentage
of compensation) for non-highly compensated employees. See Overview of Present-Law Tax Rules, supra note
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generally reduces the amount highly compensated employees can defer in salary to a
401(k) plan to well below the legally allowable maximum amount. 127
The remaining group of revenue-raising techniques used by Congress during the
deficit cycle might be characterized as the "nickel and dime" approach to pension tax
law reform. Excise tax penalties were created for premature plan distributions 128 and for
an asset reversion to an employer caused by the termination of an over-funded defined
benefit plan. 29 The maximum amount of a non-taxable plan loan was limited to
$50,000.3' Annual cost of living adjustments for contribution and deduction limits that
had been indexed for inflation were frozen,' 3' or the timing of cost of living adjustments
was delayed.'32 Finally, plan administrators were required to withhold for income taxes a
fixed 20% of any qualified plan distribution to a participant that could have been, but
was not, directly "rolled over" to another eligible qualified plan or an IRA ("the direct
rollover rules").'33
One more set of rules must be described to complete this historical overview of pen-
sion "reform" legislation enacted during the deficit cycle. In TEFRA and DEFRA, Con-
gress created the top-heavy rules.'34 Both the top-heavy rules and the nondiscrimination
rules are concerned with the more equitable distribution of plan benefits to rank-and-file
employees. Unfortunately, these two sets of rules use different definitions ("key em-
ployee" versus "highly compensated employee") for purposes of numerical testing, mak-
ing the top-heavy rules a prime target for pension "simplification" during the surplus
cycle'35
Toward the end of the deficit cycle, it was beginning to become apparent that many
workers, particularly those in the "baby-boomer" generation, were ill-prepared finan-
cially for retirement. 36 Although lawmakers in Congress clearly were concerned that
30, at 9; see generally FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 93, CHAP. 8, 96-97
(describing the ADP test).
127. See FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 93, Table 8.1 at 98. When
combined with the cap on compensation, the usual result is to further reduce the amount highly compensated
employees can defer in salary for the 401(k) plan. See Liston & LaBombarde, supra note 122, at 133-34.
128. See TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1123, 100 Stat. at 2472.
129. See TAMRA, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6069, 102 Stat. at 3704; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 12002, 104 Stat. 1388-1, 1388-562 (increasing the employer's excise tax on
asset reversions from terminated plans to 50%).
130. See TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1134, 100 Stat. at 2483.
131. See DEPRA, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 15, 98 Stat. at 505.
132. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 732, 108 Stat. 4809, 5004.
133. See Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-318, § 521, 106 Stat. 290,
300.
134. See TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 240, 96 Stat. 514; DEFRA, Pub. L. No. 98-368, § 524, 98 Stat.
872 (codified at I.R.C. § 416 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). The purposes of the top-heavy rules are to allocate
more plan benefits to "non-key" employees and to vest these benefits more quickly in plans that are "top-
heavy" with benefits for "key" employees. See I.R.C. § 416 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See generally U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: "TOP-HEAVY RULES FOR OWNER-DOMINATED PLANS G-20
(2000).
135. Compare I.R.C. § 416(i)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (definition of key employees) with I.R.C. §
414(q) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (definition of highly-compensated employees).
136. See generally Hearing On Defusing the Retirement Time Bomb: Encouraging Pension Savings Be-
fore the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations of the House of Representatives Committee on
Education and the Workforce, 105th Cong. (1997); Targeted Incentives to Increase Personal Savings: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 104th Cong. (1995); IRAs, 401(k) Plans, and Other Savings Propos-
als: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 104th Cong. (1995); U.S. Private Savings Crisis--Long-
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workers lacked employer-sponsored pension coverage and were not saving for retire-
ment on their own, concern over the budget deficit limited their ability to pass legisla-
tion addressing these problems.'37 This attitude changed dramatically once it became
apparent to lawmakers that budget surpluses would soon replace budget deficits.
4. The Pension Law Surplus Cycle: 1996 - Present
Legislative efforts to reduce the budget deficit, aided by sustained economic growth,
proved successful. Congress responded by reversing course in pension tax policy. In-
stead of legislation designed to raise tax revenues by reducing the pension tax expendi-
Term Economic Implications and Options for Reform: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Deficits, Debt
Management and Long-Term Economic Growth of the Senate Committee on Finance, 103rd Cong. (1994);
Retirement Income Security: Can the Baby Boom Generation Afford to Retire: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on Social Security of the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, 103d Cong.
(1993).
Congressman Harris F. Fawell described the problem as follows:
It does not take a mathematician to recognize that in the future retir-
ing Americans will have to rely less on social security and more on pen-
sion and personal savings. With the coming retirement of baby boomers,
we face a demographic time bomb that is going to explode and hurt a lot
of people if we do not begin defusing it now. Make no mistake, we have
all known of this problem for a long time. Sixteen years ago this month
President Carter's Commission on Pension Policy reported that a "serious
crisis" existed in our retirement income programs, and that baby boomers
will place "severe strains" on an "already overburdened system." It's 16
years later and the problems have only gotten bigger as they have come
closer.
To defuse the retirement time bomb, we must increase accessibility--
by giving Americans easier access to pensions and the ability to save for
retirement. We must increase security--by making sure retirement nest
eggs are as well protected under the Federal pension law, ERISA, as pos-
sible to ensure a solid system where money can grow. And we must in-
crease information--by making sure American workers have an under-
standing of the need for, and the steps to achieve, retirement savings they
can count on in their golden years.
Hearing on Defusing the Retirement Time Bomb, supra, at 4.
137. The following exchange illustrates the point.
[Congressman Harris F. Fawell, Chairman:] I think all of us would agree that OBRA 87 was perhaps a
tragic mistake but maybe something we can't change right now because of revenue problems. It certainly has a
deep detrimental effect upon defined benefit plans, I gather, because employers were just proscribed from
being able to adequately, I gather, fund... So, apparently it had a terrible effect, because we were trying to
save revenue so we could balance the budget, which we never did anyway. But we always use that as being
good pension law... So I guess that would be something that I would be--I guess most everybody would say
that was a mistake .... I will start with [you], Mr. [Sylvester J.] Schieber. If you had your druthers, which law
would you say this is what we should at least immediately do?
Mr. Schieber: If you are going to start with the premise that we could not afford to reverse OBRA 87, for
example, you are saying that you have absolutely no resources at the Federal level to address this larger na-
tional savings issue----
Chairman Fawell: We are not an appropriations committee, as I say.
Mr. Schieber: Well, you may be out running this race with both of your hands tied behind your back and
your shoe laces tied together to boot....
Hearing on Defusing the RetirementTime Bomb, supra note 136, 144-45.
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ture, Congress began enacting legislation that increased the tax expenditure for qualified
plans and IRAs.
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 19963' ("SBJPA") represented a signifi-
cant change in Congress's approach to national retirement policy. One common theme
underlying the SBJPA was simplification of the complex rules governing the admini-
stration of qualified plans. 3 9 The purpose of these simplification amendments was to
encourage more employers to sponsor retirement plans by reducing the administrative
burden associated with plan sponsorship."4
The SBJPA also marked Congress's first attempt to expand the scope of pension
coverage by creating special incentives for employers having 100 or fewer employees. 4 '
This was done by creating a different set of rules based solely on employer size--the
creation of so-called "SIMPLE plans." 41 SIMPLE plans represent a new approach to
pension law policy. Historically, the Code Section 401(a) requirements for qualified
plans have applied to all employers, irrespective of employer size.' 43 SIIPLE plans
were the first deviation from what previously had been a uniform set of qualified plan
design rules for employers of all sizes."
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ("TRA97") followed the SBJPA. 145 TRA97 marked
another significant change in Congress's approach to national retirement policy. A re-
newed emphasis was placed on tax incentives designed to encourage individuals to save
138. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
139. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 repealed the family aggregation rules, changed the
definition of compensation for purposes of applying the Code Section 415 limits, changed the definition of a
leased employee, simplified the definition of a highly compensated employee, repealed the combined plan
limits of Code Section 415(e), allowed for waivers of the 30-day waiting period for plan distributions, simpli-
fied the minimum participation rules, and created a "safe harbor" for 401(k) plan nondiscrimination testing.
See Pub. L. No. 104-188, §§ 1431-34, 1451-52, 1454. Excepting the repeal of Code Section 415(e) and the
safe harbor for 401(k) plan nondiscrimination testing, these simplifying changes had a negligible revenue
effect. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 361-368 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1853-60. The
SBJPA did make one change that significantly reduced the pension tax expenditure. The repeal of 5-year
averaging for income taxation of lump sum distributions increased tax revenues from 1996-2000 by an esti-
mated $337 million. See Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1401, H.R: CONF. REP. No. 104-737 at 364 (1996), reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1856.
140. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 240-74 (1996), reprinted in 1.996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1732-66; S.
REP. No. 104-281, at 73-98 (1996); reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1547-72.
141. Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1422, 110 Stat. 1800-01.
142. SIMPLE plans essentially are 401(k) plans with a required employer matching contribution. A
SIMPLE plan may be adopted by an employer having no more than 100 employees who does not sponsor
another retirement plan. SIMPLE plans are exempt from the special nondiscrimination rules for 401(k) plans.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text. This exemption ensures that highly compensated employees can
defer the maximum annual amount of $6,000 for the SIMPLE plan, regardless of the level of salary deferrals
made by the non-highly compensated employees. The merits of SIMPLE plans are analyzed in detail in Rich-
ard J. Kovach, A Critique of SIMPLE--Yet Another Tax-Favored Retirement Plan, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 401
(1998).
The tax subsidy for 1996-2000 for SIMPLE plans was estimated at $286 million. See H.R. CONF. REP.
NO. 104-737, at 364 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1856.
143. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
144. Prior to the enactment of SIMPLE plans, the multiple sets of rules governing qualified plans differ-
entiated among employers by type of business (private sector for profit, tax exempt organizations, educational
institutions and governmental entities and agencies) or by type of plan (defined benefit, defined contribution,
401(k) plan, or employee stock ownership plan, to name a few). See FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PROGRAMS, supra note 93, at CHAP. 4, 6-10, 15, 39-40.
145. Pub. L. No. 105-134, 111 Stat. 788 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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for their own retirement. The SBJPA had moved in this policy direction by increasing
the availability of deductible IRAs for non-working spouses.'46 To further encourage
private retirement savings, Congress increased the income limits for deductible IRAs.
14 7
It also created a new type of retirement savings vehicle, the "Roth" IRA, with substan-
tially higher income limits than the traditional IRA. 4 '
These three trends, administrative simplification, special incentives based solely on
employer size, and increased incentives for individual retirement savings, continue as
strong themes underlying proposed legislation to reform the pension tax law system.
Part'II examines these proposals to determine whether they are likely to advance the
goal of national retirement policy.
III. POLICY APPROACHES AND CHOICES IN PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. Conimon Themes in Proposed Legislation
During the last two years lawmakers in Congress have introduced numerous legisla-
tive bills proposing reforms to the pension tax law system. 149 A review of proposed leg-
islation reveals four common themes for change in the pension tax laws. First and fore-
most, almost all of the proposals would increase the maximum amounts under the limi-
tations rules for qualified retirement plans and IRAs. Second, some proposals would
expand the SIMPLE plan approach and create another set of special rules for defined
benefit plans sponsored by smaller employers. A third set of proposals offer tax credits
and other incentives for employers to sponsor retirement plans. Finally, many of the
146. Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1427. The estimated tax subsidy resulting from this provision for 1996-2000
was $604 million. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 364 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1856.
147. Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 301, 111 Stat. at 824-25.
148. Id. § 302. The differing tax treatment of deductible and Roth IRAs is discussed supra notes 80-82
and accompanying text. The estimated tax subsidy resulting from the changes to deductible IRAs and the
creation of the Roth IRA for 1997-2002 was $1.832 billion. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-220, at 779 (1997),
reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1590.
149. Comprehensive Retirement Security and Pension Reform Act, H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. (1999) (since
renumbered as H.R. 4843 as part of a House Ways and Means Committee amendment); Taxpayer Refund and
Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. (1999); Wage and Employment Growth Act of 1999, H.R. 3081,
106th Cong. (1999); Retirement Savings Opportunity Act of 1999, H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. (1999); Income
Security Enhancement Act of 1999, S. 8, 106th Cong. (1999); Pension Coverage and Portability Act, S. 741,
106th Cong. (1999); Retirement Savings Opportunity Act of 1999, S. 649, 106th Cong. (1999); Taxpayer
Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2082, 106th Cong. (1999); Enhanced Savings Oppor-
tunity Act, S. 60, 106th Cong. (1999); Secure Assets for Employees (SAFE) Plan Act of 1999, H.R. 2190,
106th Cong. (1999); Employee Pension Portability and Accountability Act of 1999, H.R. 1213, 106th Cong.
(1999); Retirement Account Portability Act of 1999, H.R. 739, 106th Cong. (1999); Retirement Savings Op-
portunity Act of 1999, S. 646, 106th Cong. (1999); Women's Pension Prevention Act of 1999, S. 132, 106th
Cong. (1999); Retirement Account Portability Act of 1999, S. 1357, 106th Cong. (1999); Retirement Security
Act of 1999, H.R. 1590, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1209, 106th Cong. (1999); Pension Opportunities for
Women's Equality In Retirement Act, S. 2671, 106th Cong. (2000). H.R. 2488 was passed by both houses of
Congress. President Clinton vetoed the enrolled bill on September 23, 1999. As of the time this article went to
press, H.R. 1102, supra, had been passed by the House and was awaiting action in the Senate. President Clin-
ton is on record as strongly opposing H.R. 1102, making a veto likely if the Senate passed the bill. See State-
ment of Administration Policy on H.R. 1102 (July 19, 2000) (visited Oct. 3, 2000)
<http://www.whitehouse.gov>.
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proposals would simplify the rules governing retirement plan administration. Each of
these common themes is described below.
1. Increasing Contributions and Benefits Limits
Proposals to increase the maximum amounts under the limitations rules essentially
would reverse the lower limits enacted during the deficit cycle. Table 4 below summa-
rizes the proposed increases for the limitations rules.
Other proposed reforms, however, go beyond merely restoring the limitation
amounts of the pre-1982 status quo. There are several proposed reforms that would sig-
nificantly change the way these limitations rules traditionally have functioned. The
likely result, if these reform proposals are enacted, will be a significant increase in the
pension tax subsidy.
Table 4
Proposals to Change the Limitations Rules
Estimated
Revenue Loss
Limitation Current Proposed (millions)
Rule Limit"' Limit (2000-09)
maximum annual benefit $135,000 $160,000... 396152
from a defined benefit plan
maximum contribution per $30,000 $40,000153 125"
participant from defined
contribution plans
150. The current limits in this column are for the year 2000. See IRS News Release (IR-1999-80) on Pen-
sion Plan Limitations for Tax Year 2000, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) L-2 (Oct. 20, 1999).
151. H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1201; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 301; S. 2671, 106th Cong. § 101. Other
proposals would increase this limit to $180,000. See H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 101; H.R. 2082, 106th Cong. §
2; S. 1209, 106th Cong. § 2.
152. Joint Committee on Taxation Summary and Revenue Estimates on Conference Agreement on H.R.
2488, Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, JCX-61-99R (Aug. 5, 1999).
153. H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1201; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 301; H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. § 204; S.
2671, 1. § 101. Other proposals would increase the maximum contribution limit to $45,000 and, in addition,
increase the 15% of compensation deduction limit for profit sharing and stock bonus plans, see I.R.C. § 404
(West 1999), to 25% of compensation. See H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. §§ 101, 111.
Proposed legislation also would allow participants to contribute the lesser of 100% of their compensation
or the maximum allowable dollar amount. See H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. § 204; H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 202;
S. 741, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 649, 106th Cong. § 204; H.R. 2082, 106th Cong. § 2; S. 1209, 106th Cong. § 2;
S. 60, 106th Cong. § 2; S. 646, 106th Cong. § 204.
154. Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152, at 9.
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155. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1201; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 301; H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. § 202;
H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 101; S. 649, 106th Cong. § 202; S. 646, 106th Cong. § 202. Other proposals would
increase the salary deferral limit to $12,000. See S. 741, 106th Cong. § 402. Still others would phase in the
higher $15,000 limit over a period of years. See S. 2671, 106th Cong. § 101.
156. Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152, at 8.
157. H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1201; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 301; H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. § 303; H.R.
1102, 106th Cong. § 101; S. 649, 106th Cong. § 303; S. 646, 106th Cong. § 303. Other proposals would in-
crease SIMPLE plan salary deferrals to $8,000. See S. 741, 106th Cong. § 107. Alternative proposals would
phase in the higher $10,000 limit over a period of years, see S. 2671, 106th Cong. § 101.
158. Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152, at 8.
159. H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1201; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 301; S. 741, 106th Cong. § 402; S. 2671,
106th Cong. § 101. Other proposals would increase the compensation cap to $235,000. See H.R. 1102, 106th
Cong. § 101.
160. Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152, at 9.
Estimated
Revenue Loss
Limitation Current Proposed (millions)
Rule Limit'50  Limit (2000-09)
maximum elective defer- $10,500 $15,000151 5,168156
rals--401 (k) plans
maximum elective defer- $6,000 $10,0001 7 2201 8
rals- SIMPLE plans
cap on c compensation for $170,000 $200,000159 776'60
contribution / benefit calcu-
lations
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Table 4 continued
Estimated
Revenue Loss
Limitation Current Proposed (millions)
Rule Limit5s  Limit (2000-09)
full funding limit for de- 155-170% of % Limit repealed 290163
fined benefit plan current liabili- by 2004; other
ties 6 ' deduction limits
modified
162
contribution limit for de- $2,000 Increase to 27,42965
ductible and Roth IRAs $5,000 by 2008;
indexed for infla-
tion thereafter"M
The $30,000 maximum contribution limit per participant for employer contributions
to defined contribution plans traditionally has included elective salary deferrals." 6
Lawmakers have proposed to change this rule and exclude elective salary deferrals from
the maximum contribution limit. 67 Example 4 below illustrates the effect of this pro-
posal when combined with other proposed increases under the limitations rules.
Example 4
In 2000, Employee makes a $10,500 salary deferral contribution to her employer's
401(k) plan. Because this contribution is counted toward the overall maximum limit of
$30,000 for defined contribution plans, the most that the employer can contribute for
Employee to defined contribution plans is $19,500. Employee's actual compensation is
over $210,000, but for purposes of the pension tax laws her compensation is capped at
$170,000. To contribute the maximum amount of $19,500 for Employee, the employer
150. The current limits in this column are for the year 2000. See IRS News Release (IR-1999-80) on Pen-
sion Plan Limitations for Tax Year 2000, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) L-2 (Oct. 20, 1999).
161. I.R.C. § 412(c)(7)(F) (Supp. IV 1998). Under current law the full funding limit is gradually in-
creased from 155% of current liabilities in 1999-2000 to 170% of current liabilities in 2005 and succeeding
years.
162. H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. §§ 1241-1242; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. §§ 341-342; H.R. 1546, 106th
Cong. § 205; S. 8, 106th Cong. § 429; H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 401; S. 741, 106th Cong. § 401; S. 649, 106th
Cong. § 205; H.R. 1590, 106th Cong. § 129; S. 646, 106th Cong. § 205.
163. Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152, at 10.
164. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 211. Other proposals would immediately increase the contribution
limit to $5,000, see H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. § 101; H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 101; S. 649, 106th Cong. § 101;
S. 646, 106th Cong. § 101.
165. Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152, at 2.
166. I.R.C. § 415(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Elective salary deferrals must be made to a plan estab-
lished under Code Sections 401 (k), 403(b) or 457.
167. H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1204; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 304; H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. § 204(c);
H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 105; S. 741, 106th Cong. § 112; S. 60, 106th Cong. § 2; S. 646, 106th Cong. § 204.
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must make a contribution equal to approximately 11.4% of her capped compensation.
The total amount that Employee has increased her retirement savings in qualified plans
for the year is $30,000.
In 2005, under the new pension tax laws Employee makes a $15,000 salary deferral
contribution to her employer's 401(k) plan. This contribution is no longer counted to-
ward the increased overall maximum contribution limit of $40,000 for defined contribu-
tion plans. By 2005, the Employee's compensation cap has increased to $210,000
($200,000 indexed for inflation). The employer makes a contribution for Employee to
defined contribution plans equal to 19% of her capped compensation of $210,000
($40,000). The total amount that Employee increases her retirement savings in qualified
plans for the year is $55,000--an 83% increase from 2000.
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates a revenue loss for this provision of $759
million from 2000 through 2009.68 Lawmakers also have proposed increased limits
rules for elective salary deferrals and IRAs for individuals who are age 50 or older. 69
These additional amounts are known as "catch-up" contributions because their purpose
is to allow an individual who is approaching retirement to make up for failing to save
adequately in younger years. 70 Example 5 below illustrates the effect of enacting pro-
posed "catch-up" contributions when combined with other proposed changes to the limi-
tations rules.
Example 5
Assume that in 2005 Employee is age 50. She defers $15,000 in salary to her em-
ployer's 401(k) plan. Under the new pension tax laws she also makes an additional
"catch up" contribution to her 401(k) plan of $7,500 (50% of her regular 401(k) salary
deferral amount). Her total 401(k) plan contributions for the year are $22,500--a 125%
increase from 2000.
The employer also makes a contribution for Employee to defined contribution plans
equal to 19% of her capped corripensation of $210,000 ($40,000). Employee has in-
creased her retirement savings in qualified plans for the year by $62,500, a 108% in-
crease from 2000.
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates a revenue loss for catch-up provisions
for elective salary deferrals of $825 million and for IRAs of $3,694 million from 2000 to
2009.171
In my examples above, the hypothetical employee is a highly-compensated em-
ployee with earnings above the compensation cap. Example 5 assumes that the 401(k)
plan is a safe harbor plan with employer matching contributions. Such a safe harbor is
exempt from ADP testing, thereby allowing all of the highly compensated employees to
168 Joint Committee on Taxation Summary and Revenue Estimates on Conference Agreement on H.R.
2488, Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, JCX-61-99R (Aug. 5, 1999).
169. H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. §§ 214, 1221; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 321; H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. §
401; H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 649, 106th Cong. § 401; S. 646, 106th Cong. § 401; S. 2671, 106th
Cong. § 201.
170. See generally Kovach, supra note 142, at 422.
171. Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152, at 3, 9.
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defer the maximum amount to the 401(k) plan. 7 2 If the employer's 401(k) plan does not
qualify for the ADP testing 'exemption, the amount of the hypothetical employee's
maximum salary deferral is likely to be substantially less due to the additional limits of
the ADP test on salary deferrals of highly-compensated employees.1
73
Under current law, if my hypothetical employee deferred more in salary than was
permitted under the ADP test, one correction method is to distribute the "excess" contri-
bution amount to the highly-compensated employee. 7 4 Proposed legislation would
change this rule so that excess contributions of highly-compensated employees to 401(k)
plans are treated similarly to after-tax contributions to Roth IRAs. 75 The employee's
excess contribution amount (called a "qualified plus contribution") would be treated as
an after-tax contribution to the plan. The qualified plus contribution amount stays inside
the 401(k) plan until withdrawn. Investment earnings on excess contribution amounts,
like investment earnings for Roth IRAs, would not be taxed when earned or
withdrawn. 7 6 Although my hypothetical employee loses the benefit of an immediate
income tax savings for the qualified plus contribution, she gains the longer term benefit
of tax-free investment earnings. The estimated revenue loss from this provision is $155
million from 2000 to 2009.77 The real revenue loss, of course, would likely not be seen
until after 2009, when accumulated investment earnings on qualified plus contributions
are withdrawn by the numerous employees free of federal income tax.
2. SAFE (or SMART) Defined Benefit Plans for Smaller Employers
Lawmakers have proposed to build upon the SIMPLE plan's approach to reform by
creating a separate set of rules for defined benefit plans sponsored by smaller
employers.' 78 The proposal for these SAFE (or SMART) defined benefit plans is based
on a model advocated by the American Society of Pension Actuaries.'79 Defined benefit
retirement plans are uncommon among smaller employers. 8 ° Proponents of SAFE plans
contend that creating a less complex set of administrative rules for smaller employers
will encourage them to sponsor defined benefit plans for their workers.' Proponents
also argue that making SAFE plans available for smaller employers is particularly im-
portant because "small business employees who are baby boomers and who have not
172. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(12) (Supp. IV 1998).
173. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
174. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(f) (as amended in 1994). The employee is subject to income tax on this
distribution of excess contributions.
175. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1208; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 308; H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. § 201;
H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 112; S. 649, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 646, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 2671, 106th Cong. §
104.
176. See Summary of the Revenue Provisions of the Conference Agreement on H.R. 2488, The "Tax-
payer Refund and Relief Act of 1999," 21, Joint Comm. on Taxation, JCX-66-99 (Aug. 6, 1999).
177. Summary of Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152, at 9.
178. See H.R. 2190, 106th Cong. § 2; H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. § 302; S. 8, .106th Cong. § 415; S. 741,
106th Cong. § 103; S. 649, 106th Cong. § 302; H.R. 1590, 106th Cong. § 111; H.R. 2190, 106th Cong. § 2;
H.R. 1213, 106th Cong. § 4; S. 646, 106th Cong. § 302.
179. See Pensions: Simplified Defined Benefit Plan Bill Introduced In House by Pension Leaders, 96
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), G-4 (May 19, 1997) [Pensions].
180. See SMALL ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 11, Table 1 at 5 (only 15% of all employees of smaller
employers participate in defined benefit plans).
181. See Pensions, supra note 179.
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previously been covered under retirement plans will not be able to save enough under
the newly enacted SIMPLE or a Section 401(k) plan to provide an adequate retirement
income."1
8 2
The eligibility requirements for the SAFE plan are the same as for the SIMPLE plan.
SAFE plans would be available only to smaller employers who do not sponsor another
qualified plan (other than a SIMPLE or 401(k) plan).'83 The employer would elect a
SAFE plan benefit for participants of either one, two, or three percent of compensation
for each year of service."8 Each participant would be immediately and fully vested in
his SAFE plan benefits.185 The SAFE plan benefits would be fully funded on an actuarial
basis at all times.'86 Example 6 below illustrates the retirement benefit available to a
participant in a SAFE plan.
Example 6
In 2000, Employer establishes a SAFE plan, electing to provide a benefit to each
employer equal to three percent of compensation for each year of service. In 2025, Em-
ployee retires after 25 years of service with an average salary of $40,000. Employee will
receive a minimum annual pension benefit of $30,000. 17
3. Tax Credits and Other Financial Incentives for New Plan Sponsorship
In addition to SAFE plans, proposed legislation contains a variety of other financial
incentives designed to encourage smaller employers to sponsor retirement plans. A close
review of these financial incentives indicates that these incentives will have a minimal
impact on the size of the pension tax expenditure.
One proposed incentive is a tax credit for the administrative costs of sponsoring a
new retirement plan. 188 The employer's tax credit for the costs associated with establish-
ing a new retirement plan is limited to 50% of these costs, subject to a maximum limit
varying from $2,000 to $500 for the first year and $500 for each of the following two
years.'89 Only smaller employers who do not maintain another qualified plan (other than
a SIMPLE or SAFE plan) would be eligible for this tax credit.' 9° The tax credit is par-
ticularly generous for the sole owner of an employer treated as a conduit entity for tax
purposes.' 9' For a plan with an initial start-up cost of $2000, the combined effect of the
tax credit with the owner's business deduction for plan sponsorship costs would mean
182. See Pensions, supra note 179 (Statement of Brian Graft, Executive Director of the American Society
of Pension Actuaries).
183. See H.R. 2190, 106th Cong. § 2(a).
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Pensions, supra note 179.
188. See H.R. 1590, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999); H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. § 301 (1999); S. 8, 106th Cong. §
411 (1999); H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 113 (1999); S. 741, 106th Cong. § 106 (1999); S. 649, 106th Cong. §
301 (1999); H.R. 1213 106th Cong. § 3 (1999); S. 646, 106th Cong. § 301 (1999).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See discussion infra Part L.B.2.
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that the owner would incur no costs to establish the new retirement plan.'92
Other financial incentives to reduce the costs of plan sponsorship are minimal in
amount. For example, waiving the user fee for submitting a newly established plan to
the Internal Revenue Service for a review of compliance with the Code 401(a) regula-
tions'93 will likely save the employer only $125 to $700. 94 Like the proposed SAFE plan
and the tax credit for new plans, this proposed incentive would be available only to
smaller employers.' 95
Another type of financial incentive is directed at owners of employers who are or-
ganized as S corporations, partnerships, or sole proprietorships. Under the current pen-
sion tax laws, owners of these types of employers are prohibited from receiving loans
from the employer's retirement plan.'96 Proposed legislation would repeal this prohibi-
tion, 1 7 with a resulting estimated revenue loss of $325 million for 2000 to 2009.'98 The
underlying assumption, of course, is that the owner-employee will be more willing to
sponsor a qualified plan if he has the ability to benefit by personally taking out a loan
from the plan.
4. Administrative Simplification
The Small Business Jobs Protection Act made numerous changes aimed at simplify-
ing the administration of qualified plans. 99 Many of the current proposals continue this
trend, targeting the complex rules for direct rollovers, 2°° the required minimum distribu-
tion rules, 2° ' annual valuations for defined benefit plans,2"2 annual form 5500
reporting,20 3 and the IRS-administered system of programs to correct compliance fail-
192. For example, assume that the employer is organized as an S corporation having only one share-
holder, 0. If 0 is in a 50% marginal income tax bracket (combined state and federal), a deduction of $2,000
incurred to establish the new plan results in a personal income tax savings of $1,000. When the effect of the
deduction is added to the tax credit of $1,000, 0 has saved a total of $2,000 in taxes for establishing the plan,
which negates the corporation's start-up costs of $2,000.
193. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1206 (1999); H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 306 (1999); H.R. i102, 106th
Cong. § 109; S. 741,106 h Cong. § 110.
194. For an individualized plan applying the ratio percentage coverage test submitted for determination
on Form 5300, the user fee is $700. For a prototype or volume submitter plan applying the ratio percentage
coverage test submitted for determination on Form 5307, the user fee is $125. See Internal Revenue Service
Form 8717, User Fee for Employer Plan Determination Letter Request (Rev. Feb. 2000). If the employer's
plan applies the average benefit coverage test, the user fee is $1,000 to $1,250. See id. The estimated loss of
revenue for this provision from 2000 to 2009 is $52 million. See Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R.
2488, supra note 152, at 9.
195. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1206; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 306; H.R. 1102, 106thCong. § 109;
S. 741, 106thCong. § 110.
196. I.R.C. § 4975(f)(6) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
197. H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1202; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 302; H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 102; S.
741, 106th Cong. § 101.
9 Joint Committee on Taxation Summary and Revenue Estimates on Conference Agreement on H.R.
2488, Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, JCX-61-99R, at 9 (Aug. 5, 1999).
199. See discussion supra Part I.C.3.
200. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1231-33; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. §§ 331-33; S. 8, 106th Cong. § 445-
47; H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. §§ 301-302; S. 741, 106th Cong. §§ 301-302; H.R. 1590, 106th Cong. §§ 305-
306; H.R. 1213, 106th Cong. §§ 12-14; H.R. 739, 106th Cong. §§ 2-3; S. 1357, 106th Cong. §§ 2-3 (1999).
201. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1224; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 324; H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 205;
S. 741, 106th Cong. § 206.
202. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1251; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 361.
203. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1256; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 366.
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ures. 2°4 These simplification proposals would streamline and reduce the employer's ad-
ministrative responsibilities in sponsoring a qualified plan at a minimal cost in terms of
lost revenues. °5
The top-heavy rules are another target for administrative simplification. Proposed
legislation would extend the exemption from the top-heavy rules for SIMPLE plans to
all 401(k) plans that are exempt from nondiscrimination testing because the employer
makes a specified level of matching contributions to the plan.2° In addition, the rules for
determining key employees and top-heavy status would be simplified, most notably by
repealing the family aggregation rules and ignoring 401(k) plan salary deferrals when
determining top-heavy status. 27 This proposed change would result in an estimated
revenue loss of $123 million for 2000 to 2009.08
The special nondiscrimination rules for 401(k) plans are a third target for administra-
tive simplification. Under current law a 401(k) plan is exempt from ADP testing if the
employer makes a contribution for each non-highly compensated eligible employee
equal to three percent of the employee's compensation. 2 9 Proposed legislation would
reduce this minimum employer contribution to one percent, thereby making safe harbor
treatment more affordable for sponsors of 401(k) plans.1 ° Other proposed legislation
would exempt the employer's 401(k) plan from ADP testing if the employer adopts an
"automatic enrollment" feature in its 401(k) plan. 21' The result of expanding the scope of
the ADP testing exemption would be to allow more highly compensated employees to
contribute the maximum allowable amount for salary deferrals to their 401(k) plans.
Other proposed changes appear to increase the administrative burden associated with
sponsoring 401(k) plans. In particular, plan administrators would have to monitor which
participants are eligible to make catch-up contributions to the 401(k) plan.2 12 Separate
record-keeping and accounting will be necessary to keep track of excess contributions
that the employee elects to be treated as qualified plus (after-tax) contributions to the
401(k) plan. 213 The investment earnings attributable to these qualified plus contributions
204. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1257; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 367.
205. See Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152, at 10-11. The changes to the di-
rect rollover rules would result in an estimated revenue loss from 2000 to 2009 of $106 million. All of the
other proposals for simplification are estimated to have a "negligible revenue effect." See id.
206. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1203; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 303.
207. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1203; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 303; H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 104;
S. 741, 106th Cong. § 104.
208. Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152, at 9.
209. I.R.C. § 401(k)(12)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
210. See S.8, 106th Cong. § 422; H.R. 1213, 106th Cong. § 7.
211. See H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 110; S. 741, 106th Cong. § 114. Under an "automatic enrollment"
401(k) plan, the employer automatically withholds a specified percentage (typically 3%) of each eligible
employee's compensation unless and until the employee affirmatively elects not to make salary deferral con-
tributions to the plan. See Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Automatic Enrollment 2000, (March 2,
2000) (visited Oct. 3, 2000) <http://www.psca.org/PSCAAutoenroll.pdf>.
212. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. §§ 214, 1221; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 321; H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. §
401; H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 649, 106th Cong. § 401; S. 646, 106th Cong. § 401; S. 2671, 106th
Cong. § 201.
213. See H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1208; H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. § 308; H.R. 1546, 106th Cong. § 201;
H.R. 1102, 106th Cong.§ 112; S. 649, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 646, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 2671, 106th Cong. §
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also must be accounted for separately from the employee's earnings on tax-deferred
salary deferral contributions.21 4 Thus simplification in some aspects of 401(k) plan ad-
ministration may be offset by more complex administrative duties in these areas.
B. Critique of the Proposals
Current proposals to reform the pension tax laws would result in a substantial in-
crease in the pension tax expenditure.21 Some of the proposed reforms are revenue-
neutral efforts to simplify the law,216 but many of the proposals are designed to reverse
and go beyond the changes to the limitations rules that occurred during the deficit cycle
years."' Despite the reductions in the maximum limits on qualified plan contributions
and benefits during the deficit cycle, the pension tax expenditure grew to $78.3 billion in
2000.218 The potentially dramatic impact on the fisc of these proposals for pension tax
law reform raises significant public policy questions. What will taxpaying workers gain
from this reallocation of public resources? What will be the distributional effect of these
proposed reforms? Are the proposed reforms fiscally sustainable in the long term? What
are the implications of these proposed reforms for national retirement policy in the fu-
ture? Unfortunately, as Professor Graetz and others have pointed out, lawmakers in
Congress have little incentive (other than a sense of personal moral obligation) to seek
answers to these types of tax policy questions under the current structure of the budget
process. 2'9 This problem is exacerbated in the context of pension tax law reform. Pre-
sumably many voters can understand and therefore react, positively or negatively, to
proposals to reform the personal income tax system. Only pension tax law experts are
likely to comprehend the impact of changes to the pension tax laws. 220 Subpart B of the
article examines and attempts to answer the difficult questions posed above that law-
makers have been unwilling, or unable, to face.
1. Distributional Effects of Proposed Reforms
Several studies have examined the distributional characteristics of the pension tax
laws.221 Significantly, these studies all are based on 1992 data--a point in time after the
most dramatic decreases in the contribution and benefit limits for qualified plans had
been implemented.2 22 Not surprisingly, these studies found that the deficit cycle amend-
104; Summary of the Revenue Provisions of the Conference Agreement on H.R. 2488, The Taxpayer Refund
and Relief Act of 1999," 21, Joint Comm. on Taxation, JCX-66-99 (Aug. 6, 1999).
214. See id.
215. Summary and Revenue Estimates on H.R. 2488, supra note 152. The Joint Committee on Taxation
estimates a revenue loss of $14,874,000 for 2000 to 2009 for the pension reform proposals in H.R. 2488. This
figure does not include an additional estimated revenue loss of $33,382,000 resulting from proposed changes
to the rules governing IRAs. See id. at 2-3, 11.
216. See, e.g., supra notes 200-204 and accompanying text.
217. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
218. See Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures, 1999-2003, supra note 91, at 23.
219. See sources cited supra note 84.
220. Even the pension tax law experts find it difficult to absorb the changes in the pension tax laws. See
Helm & Goldstein, supra note 95.
221. See FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 93, at 443-44; Salisbury, supra
note 27, at 94-95 and Table 5.7; Schieber & Goodfellow, supra note 27, at 112-113.
222. See id.
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ments to the pension tax laws had resulted in a more equitable system.223 As a result of
these changes, a greater portion of the pension tax expenditure was reallocated from
high-income households (over $200,000) to upper-middle income ($50,000-$100,000)
and middle-income ($30,000-$50,000) households.224
Middle-income households gain the most from pension tax incentives. Taxable re-
turns showing income between $30,000 and $50,000 (29 percent of taxable returns) paid
18 percent of taxes, received 28 percent of the pension tax incentive value, and could
experience an 18 percent tax increase if the incentives were removed. Upper middle-
income households at $50,000 to $100,000 (24 percent of taxable returns) paid 33 per-
cent of taxes, received 43 percent of the tax expenditure, and could experience a 15
percent tax increase with the end of pension incentives.225
Raising the current statutory compensation cap of $150,000, along with the other
proposed liberalizations of the limitations rules, will reverse the trend toward a more
equitable distribution of the pension tax subsidy. Higher limits on 401(k) salary defer-
rals are particularly likely to benefit higher income workers who have more discretion-
ary income to save for retirement.226 Perhaps more pernicious for lower-income workers
is the proposal to allow Roth IRA-like income tax treatment for the excess contributions
of highly compensated employees to 401(k) plans.227 If enacted, this proposal would
provide an incentive to lower the deferral amounts of non-highly compensated employ-
ees in the 401(k) plan. By lowering the actual deferral percentage of the non-highly
compensated employees, highly compensated employees will receive tax-free invest-
ment earnings on a larger portion of their salary deferral contributions.228 For highly
compensated employees, the economic benefit of tax-free investment earnings com-
pounded over a long period of time is likely to far outweigh the relatively minimal loss
of a current income tax deduction on salary deferral contributions to the plan.229
Several of the proposals to simplify plan administration are likely to increase the dis-
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. Salisbury, supra note 27, at 94-95.
226. See The Evolution of Retirement, supra note 21, at 11 (among persons who reported not yet having
begun to save for retirement, the overwhelming reason cited (66%) was having too many current financial
responsibilities). The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, citing data from the Institute for Taxation and
Economic Policy, has asserted that
"76.9 percent of the pension and IRA tax reductions from the provisions [of H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. ]
would accrue to the 20 percent of Americans with the highest income. Similarly, the institute said more than
42 percent of the pension and IRA tax breaks would go to the 5 percent of the population with the highest
incomes, while the bottom 60 percent of the population would receive less than 5 percent of the tax benefits."
Pensions: Ways and Means Committee Approves Pension Bill, Rejects Democratic Substitute Amend-
ment, [2000] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-2, G-3 (July 14, 2000), available in WL 136 DTRG-2, 2000.
227. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
228. See sources cited supra notes 175-176.
229. In his article, The Time Value of Money, Halperin conclusively demonstrated that the true tax bene-
fits of 401(k) plan contributions are not from the immediate income tax deduction, but rather from earning a
pre-tax rate of return on investment earnings that compound inside the plan. See Daniel I. Halperin, Interest In
Disguise: Taxing the Time Value of Money, 95 YALE L. J. 506, 520-24 (1986) (discussed in Halperin, supra
note 9, at 2, note 4). Allowing these investment earnings to be withdrawn tax-free would provide a tremendous
tax savings to highly compensated employees because these earnings are likely to far outweigh the after-tax
contributions made to the plan. See infra text accompanying note 276 (example of George and Maria).
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tributional inequities of the pension tax law system. Although sometimes cumbersome
to administer, the top-heavy rules for all plans and ADP testing for 401(k) plans have a
distributional function. Both operate to allocate more of the pension tax subsidy to rank-
and-file workers. The. top-heavy rules force the sponsor of a top-heavy plan to increase
the contributions or benefits of non-key employees. 230 The ADP test reduces the level of
elective salary deferrals by highly compensated employees, but places no such restric-
tions on non-highly compensated employees. 231' Exempting more plans from these rules
will undermine the effect of these distributional mechanisms.
Another aspect of distributional equity is the scope of pension plan coverage among
workers by income group. None of the current proposals for reform would require spon-
sors of pre-existing qualified plans to expand the scope of plan coverage.232 Instead, the
proposals focus on incentives to encourage new plan sponsorship, primarily among
smaller employers.233 These incentives for new plan sponsorship among smaller em-
ployers are unlikely to be effective in expanding the scope of pension coverage.
The proposed SAFE plan initiative21 is unlikely to stimulate new plan sponsorship
among smaller employers. The SAFE plan is premised on the assumption that the pri-
mary deterrent to sponsorship of defined benefit plans among smaller employers is the
burden of plan administration.23' Recent research on smaller employers, however, indi-
cates that uncertain business revenues are a much more important factor than ease of
plan administration in the smaller employer's decision to sponsor a retirement plan.236
Moreover, SAFE defined benefit plans are uniquely ill-suited for smaller employers.
The fixed cost to the employer in terms of an annual full funding obligation and the
assumption of investment risk makes them inflexible and thus unattractive to smaller
employers whose revenue levels may fluctuate from year to year.237
In summary, a closer examination of the distributional effects of proposed pension
tax law reforms indicates that many of the proposals are unlikely to expand retirement
plan coverage to workers who currently have none. Nor are these proposals likely to
enhance the retirement income security of low-income workers. Rather, these proposals
are likely to enhance the benefits of higher income employees who already participate in
a retirement plan. The likely result will be an increase in the distributional inequities of
230. See I.R.C. § 416 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). These rules also force the employer to vest the benefits of
non-key employees on an accelerated basis. See generally, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTNG OFFICE, "TOP-HEAVY
RULES, supra note 135, at 6-20.
231. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(3)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-I(b)(2) (as amended
in 1995).
232. See sources cited supra note 149.
233. See discussion supra Part ll.A.2.-3.
234. See discussion supra Part H.A.2.
235. See discussion infra Part IL.A.
236. See discussion infra Part lI.B.2. The other key motivating factor for plan sponsorship among
smaller employers is employee demand. See discussion infra Part 1LB.2.
237. One small manufacturing business owner, testifying before Congress, explained his decision to es-
tablish a profit-sharing rather than defined benefit plan as follows:
I haven't given a defined benefit plan any true thought. I felt like the only way I could fund it in the be-
ginning was that if I had a company profit I knew I wanted to share it. So, therefore, I elected to go with a
profit sharing type of plan.
I didn't feel like, as a small businessman, I could afford the unknown cost.
Hearing on Defusing the Retirement Time Bomb, supra note 136, at 160 (testimony of Bruce Young 11I,
President, Stainless Metal Products, Inc.).
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the pension tax law system.2 11
2. Fiscal Sustainability of the Proposed Reforms
The pension tax law system is frequently criticized because Congress's constant re-
vision of the rules makes compliance by employers expensive and difficult.239 Similarly,
the qualified plan rules are constantly criticized as being too "complex."' 4° Part I of this
article described how these symptoms of constant change and resulting complexity are
the product of deficit cycle amendments designed to reduce the amount of the pension
tax expenditure.24 The proposed reforms to the pension tax laws treat these symptoms,
but not their underlying cause. To the contrary, the proposed reforms, if enacted, are
likely to make the pension tax laws even more sensitive to the federal budget balancing
process in future years.
Over 60% of the current budgetary surplus is attributable to Social Security contribu-
tions that exceed required Social Security benefit payments. The Congressional Budget
Office reports that of the estimated $232 billion budget surplus in 2000, $149 billion is
due to "off-budget" accounts that consist mainly of Social Security trust funds.242 In the
future, however, an economic downturn, a decline in the level of surplus Social Security
contributions relative to benefits, or a combination of the two, will create another budget
deficit cycle. Assuming the proposed reforms have been enacted by that time, the pen-
sion tax expenditure will have grown to be an even larger, more inviting target in the
federal budget balancing process. Another round of "reform" amendments seems inevi-
table during the next deficit cycle in the federal budget.
The policy approach exemplified by SIMPLE and SAFE plans only adds to the
overall complexity of the pension tax laws.243 Although creating another set of qualified
plan rules would increase the options available to smaller employers, it also adds an-
other layer of detail for pension tax law experts to master and employers to puzzle over.
This approach makes the pension tax law system as a whole more, not less, complex.
Moreover, viewed from the perspective of the individual smaller employer, these "sim-
ple" rules are, in fact, not so simple.2" The smaller employer who outgrows his eligibil-
238. The distributional inequities of the pension tax law system are, of course, somewhat offset by the
progressive benefits structure of Social Security, that disproportionately benefits low-income workers. See
Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers, supra note 84, at 658; Goodfellow & Schieber, supra note 9, at 163-70 (analyzing
the combined distributional effect of Social Security and the pension tax expenditure). Measured in absolute
dollars, however, even the maximum Social Security monthly benefit ($1,433 in 2000) provides a meager
income. See Social Security Administration, Fact Sheet: 2000 Social Security Changes (revised Apr. 26, 2000)
(visited Oct. 3, 2000) <http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/2000colafact.htm>. Retired workers today will receive
on the average a monthly benefit of $804. See id. Justifying the distributional inequities of the pension tax
system by countering with the progressive structure of Social Security is possible only if policymakers are
willing to separate the problem of elderly poverty from national retirement policy. The difficulty with this
approach is that at a budgetary level the two issues become intertwined. A larger pension tax expenditure
constrains other federal spending programs, including programs aimed at the problem of elderly poverty.
239. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 6. See Helm & Goldstein, supra note 95.
240. See sources cited supra note 239.
241. See discussion supra Part I.C.
242. See The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, supra note 6, CHAP. ONE at 1.
243. See discussion supra Part I.C. & H.A.2.
244. See Kovach, supra note 142.
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ity limit of 100 employees, or who has become profitable enough to sponsor another
qualified plan, must transition to another set of qualified plan rules.245 I explain in Part
III why imposing such transition costs on the growth of smaller employees ultimately is
counterproductive to the goal of enhancing retirement income security for low-income
workers.2" Finally, continuing the SIMPLE plan approach by enacting its proposed
defined benefit twin, the SAFE plan, means that during the next deficit cycle Congress
will have not one, not two, but three sets of qualified plan rules based solely on em-
ployer size to "reform."
Perhaps most importantly, cyclical amendments to the pension tax laws undermine
one of the important, but often overlooked, functions of ERISA.2 47 One of the purposes
of ERISA's disclosure rules is to provide information to plan participants so that they
can make rational decisions in planning and saving for retirement.248 Constant change in
the limitations rules undermines this ability of plan participants rationally to engage in
long-term retirement planning. The importance of this rationale planning function will
only continue to grow in the future as more workers save for retirement through 401(k)
plans.249
A plan participant who has engaged in retirement planning will be pleasantly sur-
prised if, sometime in the future as he nears retirement, the rules governing qualified
plans are changed so that his contributions to or benefits from the retirement plan are
more generous than he originally planned. In contrast, if the qualified plan rules are
changed so that his contributions to or benefits from the retirement plan are less than he
has planned for, the participant may not have sufficient time or income remaining until
retirement to make up the shortfall in his projected level of retirement income. From a
participant planning perspective, it is crucial to know whether the current state of the
pension tax laws will continue throughout one's working career.
Assuming the proposed reforms are enacted, who is most likely to be "caught," and
thus harmed, by the next round of deficit cycle amendments designed to reduce the pen-
sion tax expenditure? In the short run, the expansion of Roth IRAs and the incorporation
of Roth-like features in 401(k) plans will generate tax revenues and thus help to offset
the loss of tax revenues from other changes to the pension tax laws.25 Because lawmak-
ers are not accountable under the procedures of the budget balancing process for the
long-term future revenue losses attributable to the tax-free withdraws of investment
earnings from Roth IRAs or Roth-like 401(k) plans, it is easy (and politically expedient)
for them to lose sight of (or not even consider) the long-term consequences for national
retirement policy. The adverse revenue impact of these tax-free withdrawals of invest-
245. See supra notes 142 & 183 and accompanying text. The size of the employer would continue to be
measured on a controlled group or common control basis, thereby preventing employers from circumventing
the 100 employee limitation through the creation of subsidiaries. See I.R.C. § 414 (b),(c) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
246. See discussion infra Part H.B.2.
247. See supra note 1.
248. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implementing ERISA: Of Policies and "Plans, "72 WASH. U. L. Q. 559,
568 (1994).
249. See Medill, supra note 21, at 7-9.
250. See Stretching the Pension Dollar, supra note 40, at 25.
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ment earnings will begin to be felt when the baby boomer generation retires .2" This
timing coincides, of course, with the beginning of the budgetary pressures predicted for
the time when the baby boomers will begin receiving Social Security benefits in large
numbers. Thus it appears likely that the generations of younger workers who follow
after the baby boomers will be the group who suddenly must operate under a new and
more restrictive set of qualified plan rules. It is this same group who also is likely to
bear the increased costs of Social Security benefits for the baby boomer generation. 2
In summary, the potential of proposed reforms to drain the fisc is likely to exagger-
ate the cyclical effects of the budget balancing process on pension tax policy. These
cycles are detrimental because they undermine the predictability and stability of quali-
fied plans for both sponsoring employers and plan participants. As discussed in the next
section, these proposals also potentially jeopardize popular potential support among
younger generations for another key component of national retirement policy--the Social
Security system.
3. Implications of Proposed Reforms for Social Security Policy
"Looking at each element of the retirement system without consideration of the oth-
ers is a bit like three blind men describing an elephant when one had hold of the trunk,
the second had hold of an ear, and the third had hold of a leg." '253
The pension tax laws interact with the Social Security system to form two of the
three major components of national retirement policy.254 The controversy surrounding
the future financial crisis facing of Social Security raises long-debated, complex issues
that are beyond the scope of this article.2 5' This section focuses on the discrete question
of how proposed changes to the pension tax laws may affect, and in turn be affected by,
251. In contrast to Roth IRAs and proposed Roth-like 401(k) plans, an owner of a traditional IRA or a
participant in a 401(k) plan is subject to personal income tax when he withdraws contributions and investment
earnings. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. To the extent Roth IRAs and Roth-like 401(k) plans
supplant traditional IRAs and 401(k) plans, the fisc will lose tax revenues in the future as participants make
income tax-free withdrawals, presumably at retirement.
252. See sources cited infra note 278.
253. Goodfellow & Schieber, supra note 9, at 127.
254. See Graetz, supra note 3.
255. See generally United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S.
Senate, Social Security: Different Approaches for Addressing Problem Solvency (July 1998); Prospects For
Social Security Reform (Olivia S. Mitchell, et al., eds. 1999); Framing the Social Security Debate: Values,
Politics, And Economics (R. Douglas Arnold, et al., eds., 1998); Social Security In The 21st Century (Eric R.
Kingson and James H. Schulz, eds., 1997); C. Eugene Steuerle and Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security
For The 21st Century: Right And Wrong Approaches to Reform (1994); Robert J. Myers, Social Security (4th
ed. 1993); Charles W. Meyer and Nancy Wolff, Social Security and Individual Equity: Evolving Standards Of
Equity And Adequacy (1993); Social Security: Prospects For Real Reform (Peter J. Ferrara, ed., 1985); Kath-
ryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on Women, Minorities, and Low-
Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. Rev. 341 (2000); Robert H. Binstock, Public Policies on Aging in the Twenty-
First Century, 9 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 311 (1998); Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Mis-
guided Reform, 71 Temple L. Rev. 131 (1998); Robert Greenstein, Reform Social Security, The Nation, June
21, 1999 at 5; Robert J. Barro, Don t Tinker with Social Security, Reinvent it, Bus. Week, June 8, 1998 at 24.
Once a taboo topic for all politicians, Social Security reform became a central issue in the 2000 presidential
campaign. See generally Richard W. Stevenson, Political Memo: Social Security, That Risky Issue, Is On The
Table, New York Times News Service (June 22, 2000) (2000 WL-23203068).
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Social Security. Over 60% of the budget surplus that has sparked proposals to reform
the pension tax laws is attributable to the current surplus in the Social Security trust
funds.256 Absent reform, according to a recent report of the Social Security Board of
Trustees, the Social Security trust funds will be depleted in 2037257 shortly after the last
of the "baby boom" generation retires.25 8 Thereafter, payroll contributions for Social
Security will be sufficient to pay only 72% of promised Social Security benefits. 9 Just
as the Social Security system accounts for most of today's budget surplus, unless re-
formed in the future it is likely to account for most of a substantial budget deficit. 26 A
budget deficit cycle predictably will trigger another round of pension tax law reforms
designed to reduce the size of the pension tax expenditure.26' Consequently, the future of
Social Security reform is likely to determine whether today's proposals for pension re-
form, if enacted, are fiscally sustainable.
Another key intersection of the proposed pension tax law reforms with Social Secu-
rity arises because of Social Security's transfer of wealth from younger to older genera-
262 Ti negtions. This intergenerational wealth transfer issue prompts both skepticism of the So-
256. See supra note 242 ($149 billion/$232 billion = 64%).
257. See Social Security Administration, News Release: Social Security Trust Funds Gain Three Addi-
tional Years of Solvency (March.30, 2000) (visited October 3, 2000).
<http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/3solvency.htm>; Social Security Administration, Status of the Social Security
and Medicare Programs: A Summary of the 2000 Annual Reports, 9 (Rev. April 2000) (visited Oct. 3, 2000)
<http://www.ssa.gov>. Analysts disagree about the exact date upon which the OASDI's trust funds will be
depleted, with the projected dates for depletion ranging from 2029-2037. Analysts agree, however, that after
the trust funds are depleted, incoming funds, primarily in the form of payroll taxes, will only be able to supply
three-fourths (3/4) of required outlays. See Preparing Americans for Retirement: The Roadblocks to Increased
Savings: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. On Aging and the House Subcomm. On Employer-
Employee Relations, 105th Cong. 2 (1998) (statement of Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chairman); Michael J.
Boskin, A Framework for Considering Social Security Reform, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE,
supra note 255, 29, 32; Olivia S. Mitchell, et al., An Overview of the Issues, in PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra
note 255, 3, 6; Edward M. Gramlich, The United States: How to Deal with Uncovered Future Social Security
Liabilities, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 739 (1998); Moore, supra note 255 at 132.
258. The "baby boom" generation is defined as those people bom from 1946-1964. See Binstock, supra
note 255 at 311.
. 259. See Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs, supra note 257, at 9; see generally Social
Security Program Solvency, in DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING PROBLEM SOLVENCY, supra note
255 at 33; Hugh Heclo, A Political Science Perspective on Social Security Reform, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL
SECURITY DEBATE, supra note 255, 65, 77; STEUERLE AND BAKUA, supra note 255 at 3; Mitchell, supra note
257 at 10; Moore, supra note 255, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. at 143; William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in
the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1469 (1986).
260. Currently, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid account for 40% of all federal spending. See
Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2001-2010, 7 (Jan. 2000)
(visited Oct. 3, 2000) <http://www.cbo.gov>. Medicare and Medicaid are closely related to Social Security as
a three-pronged social safety net for the elderly. Medicare subsidizes medical care for the elderly. Medicaid
subsidizes custodial (nursing home) care for the indigent elderly. The Congressional Budget Office estimates
that by the year 2030, these three programs will account for more than two-thirds of all federal spending. See
id.
261. See supra Part I.C.2.
262. See SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM SOLVENCY, supra note 255 at 7; Heclo, supra note 259 at 79; Bin-
stock, supra note 255 at 313; Simon, supra note 261 at 1457, 1470; Meyer, supra note 255 at 22; Marilyn
Moon, Are Social Security Benefits Too High or Too Low?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 255, at 71; Theodore R. Marmor, et al., Social Security Politics and the Conflict Between Generations, in
SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY, supra note 255, at 195; STEUERLE & BAKuA, supra note 255 at 108;
Joseph F. Quinn, Criteria for Evaluating Social Security Reform, in PROSPECTS FORSOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM, supra note 255; Stephen G. Kellison & Marilyn Moon, New Opportunities for the Social Security
System, in PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note 255, 60, 65; John Geanakoplos, et al., Social Security Money s
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cial Security system among younger workers263 and proposals to "privatize" Social Secu-
rity.264 As the ratio of contributions paid to benefits received continues to fall for
younger workers,265 popular political support for Social Security among this group is
likely to decline.
Current pension tax law proposals to allow additional "catch-up" contributions to
401(k) plans for persons age 50 and older2 67 exacerbate the generational inequities al-
ready present in the Social Security system. Such provisions explicitly allocate more of
Worth, in PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note 255, 80; Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under a Partially
Privatized Social Security System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 974 (1998); Moore, supra note 255, 71 TEMPLE L. REv.
at 143; Michael J. Boskin, et al., Social Security: A Financial Appraisal Across and Within Generations, 40
NAT'L TAx J. 19, 22-26 (1987); Maria O'Brien Hylton, Evaluating the Case for Social Security Reform: Eld-
erly Poverty, Paternalism, and Private Pensions, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 749, 755 (1998); Paul Craig Roberts,
The Social Security Shell Game, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999 at A14; No Alternative: the Contract Between
the Generations Needs Renegotiating, Not Ditching, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 1996 at S16; Robert J. Samuel-
con, Justice Among Generations: Stocks Won t Spare Us From Cuts in Social Security and Medicare,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20, 1997 at 29; Social Security has Become a Giant Pyramid Scheme, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 10,
1988 at 28.
263. Interestingly, although younger workers generally are not confident that Social Security benefits will
exist for them during their retirement, at present they nevertheless support the system because they see the
how their elderly relatives benefit from the system and recognize its importance as a social safety net for low-
income retirees. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, Myths and Misunderstandings About Public
Opinion Toward Social Security, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE, supra note 255 at 357; Quinn,
supra note 262 at 46; Introduction, in PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note 255 at 7; Eric R. Kingson & James
H. Schultz, Preface, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 255, at xii; Kingson, supra note
255 at 178, 183; MYERS, supra note 255 at 459; Gramlich, supra note 257 at 744.
264. See SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM SOLVENCY, supra note 255 at 5; Moore, supra note 262 at 971,
977; Heclo, supra note 259 at 67; Kent A. Smetters, Thinking About Social Security s Trust Fund, in
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note 255, 201, 212; Robert C. Pozen & John M. Kimpel, Investments and
Administrative Constraints on Individual Social Security Accounts, in PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note
255 at 372; John C. Goodman, Private Alternatives to Social Security: The Experience of Other Countries, in
PROSPECTS FOR REAL REFORM, supra note 255, 103; Peter J. Ferrara, Social Security Reform: Some Theoreti-
cal Considerations, in PROSPECTS FOR REAL REFORM, supra note 255, 173; John Geanakoplos, et al., Would a
Privatized Social Security System Really Pay a Higher Rate of Return?, in FRAMING THE DEBATE, supra note
255, 137, 138; Lawrence H. Thompson, Individual Uncertainty in Retirement Income Planning under Differ-
ent Public Pension Regimes, in FRAMING THE DEBATE, supra note 255, 113; Binstock, supra note 255 at 315-
16; Moore, supra note 255 at 132, 148-9; Simon, supra note 259 at 1446-7, 1485; Gramlich, supra note 257 at
746; Jane Bryant Quinn, Are Private Social Security Accounts Practical?, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1998 at H02.
265. See MYERS, supra note 255 at 512; Gramlich, supra note 257 at 743; Kingson, supra note 255 at 76,
275; Introduction, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURrrY DEBATE, supra note 255 at I.
Dilley criticizes this "money's worth" analysis of Social Security contributions versus benefits on broader
policy grounds. She argues that:
[t]he proper measure of redistribution [of Social Security dollars] is not how contribu-
tions compare to benefits but instead how the benefits paid out to low-wage workers
compare to the level of income needed to maintain an independent life at retirement, at
an income level comparable to--or even improving on for those at the bottom of the
wage scale--the income level while working.
Dilley, supra note 7, at 1185. Others would treat the problem of working career poverty carrying over into
retirement poverty as separate and distinct from questions of national retirement policy. See Gratz, supra note
3, at 856, n. 9.
266. See Gramlich, supra note 257, at 744; Robert J. Myers, Will Social Security Be There For Me?, in
SOCIAL SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY, supra note 255, 208. Heclo, supra note 259 at 66, 81; Jacobs and
Shapiro, supra note 263 at 358, 364-5; Simon, supra 255 note at 1469; Quinn, supra note 264 at 50-5 1.
267. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
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the pension tax expenditure to the babyboomer generation.26 Proponents of the concept
of catch-up provisions argue that workers who are approaching the end of their working
careers are at their earnings peak and are better positioned to save for retirement.269 Al-
lowing persons age 50 or older the opportunity to make additional 401(k) plan salary
deferrals, proponents argue, will enhance the retirement income security of workers,
particularly women, who were unable to save for retirement earlier in their career be-
cause of child-rearing responsibilities or more pressing current financial
responsibilities.270
Perhaps catch-up contributions could be justified as promoting overall national re-
tirement policy if they were limited to persons who are in danger of having inadequate
retirement income. As currently proposed, however, the sole eligibility criterion for
catch-up provisions is age.27' There is no test for eligibility based on the individual's
income or net worth.2 72 Allowing catch-up contributions for every worker who has at-
tained age 50 will increase the distributional inequities of the pension tax law system.2 73
It is the workers with higher incomes who are most likely to utilize the higher contribu-
tion limits allowed under the catch-up provisions.
The catch-up provisions also encourage behavior among younger workers that un-
dermines the overall policy goal of enabling workers to achieve an adequate income
during retirement. Allowing catch-up contributions encourages the (mis)perception
among younger workers that they do not need to begin saving large amounts for retire-
ment until later in their working careers.27" In fact, just the opposite is true. Younger
workers will be much better prepared for retirement if they saved smaller amounts early
in their working careers. The following example, taken from the Complete Idiot's Guide
to 401(k) Plans,275 illustrates the point.
George and Maria are both age 20.] Maria decides to save $2,500 each year for 10
years. George, on the other hand, says "I'll wait, I'm young and have plenty of time."
(Sound familiar?) So he saves nothing.
At age 30, they reverse roles .... Maria stops saving and George starts to save
$2,500 a year. They continue this strategy for the next 35 years, with each earning an
8 percent annual return on their money. Our question for you: Who has more money
at age 65? George or Maria?
You would think it's George. After all, he saved over three times what Maria did--
$87,500 versus $25,000. But Maia's ahead at age 65. She has over $114,000 more
($535,472) than George does ($430,792), even though she saved $62,500 less.276
268. See id.
269. See CONG. REC. S 10310 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (Statement of Sen. Hutchinson); CONG. REc. H
846 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2000) (Statement of Rep. Johnson); Kovach, supra note 142, at 422.
270. See sources cited supra note 269. Thus the catch-up provisions are characterized in proposed legisla-
tion as pension reforms "enhancing faimess for women." See, e.g., H.R. 2488, 106"' Cong., Title XH, Subtitle
B.
271. See sources cited supra note 169.
272. See sources cited supra note 169.
273. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
274. See The Evolution of Retirement, supra note 21, at 11-13. The 1999 Retirement Confidence Survey
found that among persons who had not yet begun saving for retirement, 24% cited as a major reason why that
"lots of time remains until retirement." See id. at 11. Among Generation X workers not currently saving for
retirement, 78% (more than any other generational group) reported that it would be possible for them to save
$20 a week for retirement. See id. at 12-13.
275. Wayne G. Bogosian & Dee Lee, The Complete Idiot's Guide to 401(k) Plans (1998).
276. See id. at 43-44.
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Finally, it is doubtful that catch-up provisions are fiscally sustainable in the long
term. Allowing them will greatly increase the pension tax expenditure.2 7 7 Their inevi-
table repeal during a future deficit cycle will fuel the intergenerational tensions that
already exist in national retirement policy as a result of the structure of Social Secu-
rity. Young workers, already likely to be bearing the burden of increased Social Secu-
rity and Medicare payroll taxes for baby boomer retirees, 278 will only become further
disenchanted when the catch-up contributions they have relied upon to fund their own
retirement are repealed.
IV. TARGETED PENSION REFORM
"Thus, in order to evaluate current tax policy accurately, it is important to know
whether the tax benefits of qualified plans truly lead to a significant increase in cover-
age, or whether non-tax reasons so dominate that the tax incentives are of relatively
minor importance." '279
In his article, A New Dynamics of Tax Policy?,280 Pollack describes how tax experts
in the government bureaucracy, outside experts from public policy think tanks, tax pol-
icy "entrepreneurs,"28' and lobbying groups play a significant role in the formation of tax
policy. 2 2 The influence of these players in the policy process lies in their ability to shape
and determine the menu of alternatives (proposed legislation) from which congressional
lawmakers must choose to address a perceived problem of public policy.283 Pollack de-
scribes how, prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a shared "ideology"
concerning tax reform developed among and dominated the thinking of middle and high
level government tax bureaucrats and outside tax experts.2" When congressional law-
makers became interested in enacting tax reform, according to Pollack it was this shared
ideology that dominated the legislative agenda and eventually resulted in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986.285
A similar ideological movement today appears to underlie current legislative propos-
als for pension tax law reform.2 8 6 I describe this movement as the "traditional approach"
277. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
278. See SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM SOLVENCY, supra note 255 at 5, 20, 34; Binstock, supra note 255
at 315; Introduction, in PROSPECTS FOR REAL REFORM, supra note 255 at 2; STEUERLE & BAKUA, supra note
255 at 159; John Rother & William E. Wright, Americans'Views of Social Security and Social Security Re-
forms, in PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, supra note 255, 380, 385; Peter A. Diamond, The Economics of Social
Security Reform, in FRAMING THE DEBATE, supra note 255, 38, 39; Edward M. Gramlich, discussion, in
FRAMING THE DEBATE, supra note 255 at 424; Gramlich, supra note 257 at 741; Hylton, supra note 262 at
750, 755; Moore, supra note 255, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. at 145.
279. Halperin, supra note 9, at 7.
280. See Pollack, supra note 84.
281. Pollack describes a policy "entrepreneur" as follows: "The policy entrepreneur peddles ideas--often
ideas that have been in the air for decades, but which find a place on the policy agenda as some political figure
finds it convenient and appealing to promote such issue at that particular time." Id. at 74.
282. See id. at 69-84.
283. See id. at 69-7 1.
284. See id. at 71-72.
285. See id. at 70.
286. Certainly most of the characteristic players described by Pollack are present in the current move-
ment for pension tax law reform. Senator Roth is an example of the classic tax policy entrepreneur. Experts
regularly have testified before Congress on pension reform. See Portman Praises GOP Tax Bill; Study Shows
Need for Pension Reform, DAILY TAX REP. G-3 (Aug. 1I, 1999). Lobbying groups also have been active in
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to pension tax reform. Although numerous bills to reform the pension tax laws have
been introduced in Congress, Part H's analysis reveals that there is at present no vigor-
ous public debate over alternatives for pension tax reform. Proposed reforms all offer
similar, if not identical, solutions to expanding the scope of retirement plan coverage.
Parts III and IV of the article introduce an alternative to the traditional approach,
targeted pension reform, which would expand retirement plan coverage for rank-and-
file workers. In the process, targeted pension reform would improve the distributional
equities of the pension tax law system.
Part III develops a theoretical foundation for targeted pension reform (the "targeted
reform theory"). This theoretical foundation focuses on the factors influencing the em-
ployer's decision-making process for voluntary plan sponsorship and plan coverage
design. Part IV builds upon this theoretical foundation by offering an alternative legisla-
tive proposal designed to achieve the goals of targeted pension reform.
A. Flawed Assumptions Underlying the Traditional Approach to Pension Re-
form
Both government and outside experts in the pension field have expressed concern
that the scope of retirement plan coverage, expressed as a percentage of the workforce,
has remained stagnant at around 50% of the workforce.2"7 The traditional approach as-
sumes that pension plan coverage has failed to expand in scope because Congress re-
duced the tax incentives and benefits for employers and highly-compensated employees
288 In the process, these amendments made pension tax law more "complex," thereby
increasing the administrative costs of plan sponsorship and further deterring employers
from sponsoring retirement plans.289 These two interrelated assumptions underlie the
traditional approach to pension tax reform.
The traditional approach to pension reform evolved with the nondiscrimination rules
governing retirement plans.2" Historically pension plans began as an employer benefit
shaping proposals for reform. The SAFE defined benefit plan is being promoted by the American Society of
Pension Actuaries. The Council for Capital Formation and the Association of Private Pension and Welfare
Plans, two groups representing large employers, commissioned the Stretching the Pension Dollar, supra note
40, that lawmakers have relied upon in shaping and promoting proposed legislation. The proposed reforms
contained in this study have been directly incorporated into pension reform legislation. Compare Stretching
the Pension Dollar, supra note 40, with discussion of proposed reform legislation, supra Part II.A.
287. See sources cited supra note 9.
288. See, e.g., Michael J. Gulotta, Changing Private Pension Funding Rules and Benefit Security, in
PENSION FUNDING & TAXATION, supra note 27, at 119-124 (characterizing changes to the funding and deduc-
tion rules as "break[ing] the bond between executives, who decide on funding policy for these plans, and the
vast majority of plan participants."); IRAs, 401(k) Plans, and Other Savings Proposals, supra note 136, at 21
(testimony of John Mothey, National Federation of Independent Businesses).
289. See, e.g., Edwin C. Hustead, Trends in Retirement Income Plan Administrative Expenses, in LIVING
WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, 166-77 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber, eds. 1998);
MCGILL, supra note 63, at 39-42.
290. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4) (1994), 410(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules
for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 426-29
(1984) (describing historical evolution and purposes of the nondiscrimination rules prior to the changes made
by the Tax Reform Act of 1986); Michael W. Melton, Making the Nondiscrimination Rules of Tax-qualified
Plans More Efficient, 71 BOSTON U. L. REV. 47 (1991) (describing the nondiscrimination rules as amended by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
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available only to a small group of high-level management employees of the employer.29'
The nondiscrimination rules forced employers to cover a broader range of employees in
their retirement plans.2 92 Essentially, coverage of lower paid employees became the
"price" that the employer must pay for the highly paid management employees to re-
ceive their tax-subsidized retirement plan benefits.
An inherent policy tension exists between encouraging employers to provide for re-
tirement income for their employees, and placing limitations on the loss in tax revenues
that results from retirement plans.293 As a matter of national retirement policy we want
to encourage employers to sponsor plans that will provide retirement income and thus
offer a tax subsidy to encourage such employer behavior. But this tax subsidy and the
resulting drain on the fisc are difficult to justify unless retirement plan coverage and
benefits are made available to rank-and-file employees.
The traditional approach relies heavily on the circumstance that the highly compen-
sated employees generally are the same employees who are managing the company and
making decisions about plan sponsorship and design. The underlying premise of the
traditional approach is that the greater the tax subsidy personally available to these
highly compensated employees, the more willing they will be to have the business pay
the price for nondiscrimination. It is this assumption that underlies current proposals to
reform the pension tax law system.2 If reducing the employer's tax subsidy for sponsor-
ing a retirement plan and the associated'tax benefits for highly compensated employees
during the deficit cycle caused plan coverage to stagnate, then (lawmakers assume) re-
versing these changes to allow for more generous tax incentives necessarily (lawmakers
hope) will result in expanded retirement plan coverage.
Will increasing the pension tax incentives for highly compensated employees result
in expanded pension coverage for rank-and-file workers? One test of a theory's ability to
predict the future is its ability to explain the past. The assumptions that underlie the
traditional approach to pension reform fail this test. These assumptions are inconsistent
with current trends295 in retirement plan sponsorship and coverage design.
First, the traditional approach fails to explain the tendency of larger employers to ex-
clude low-income workers from retirement plan coverage.2 96 Under the traditional ap-
proach, employers are motivated to sponsor retirement plans because they want to ob-
tain the benefits for their highly compensated employees. The least costly way for the
employer to obtain qualified plan benefits for its highly compensated employees is to
include the required number of non-highly compensated employees by starting at the
291. See Wolk, supra note 290, at 426-28.
292. See WIEDENBECK & OSGOOD, supra note 62, at 203-05.
293. See id. at 427-29.
294. See discussion supra Part H.A.
295. The assumptions that underlie the traditional approach, along with fundamental structural change in
the United States economy, do appear to explain the historical decline of defined benefit plans. See Medill,
supra note 21, at 6, note 24. There is some evidence that sponsorship of defined benefit plans in the past was
heavily influenced by the employer's tax subsidy, and that reducing the amount of this subsidy caused a de-
cline in the number of defined benefit plans. See Robert L. Clark, Ann A. McDermed & Michelle White
Trawick, Firm Choice of Type of Pension Plan: Trends and Determinants, in THE FUTURE OF PENSIONS,
supra note 9, 115-116.
296. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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bottom of the compensation scale and working upwards. This approach minimizes the
employer's costs because the employer's contributions to a qualified plan generally are a
function of each participant's compensation. 297 Thus, based on the assumptions of the
traditional approach one would expect to see a coverage pattern that included low-
income workers and excluded workers in the middle of the salary scale (the employees
at the upper range of the non-highly compensated employees' compensation scale). But
the empirical data, at least at an aggregate level, indicate that this is not what many em-
ployers do.29 The coverage pattern is generally to include the higher paid workers and
exclude the lower paid workers from plan coverage.
299
Second, the continued phenomenal growth of 401(k) plans since 1986 undermines
the ability of the traditional approach to predict employer behavior.3 °° The special non-
discrimination rules for 401(k) plans enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had two
effects. Significant limitations were placed on the ability of highly compensated em-
ployees to make salary deferrals to the plan.3"' These limitations often reduced the level
of salary deferral contributions for highly compensated employees to far below the
maximum amount allowed to non-highly compensated employees.30 2 In addition, the
administrative burden on employers of complying with these more stringent nondis-
crimination rules for 401(k) plans increased significantly.3 3 Given these two effects, the
traditional approach would predict that 401(k) plans should have at least slowed in
popularity after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Instead, 401(k) plans have continued to
grow in popularity among employers.3t 4 In 1995 (the most recent figures available), 55%
of all contributions to retirement plans were to 401(k) plans.30 5
Finally, the traditional approach does not explain the overwhelming popularity of
401(k) plans among employers having fewer than 100 employees.3" Congress did not
enact simplified rules for 401(k) plans sponsored by these smaller employers until the
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996."0 Prior to the enactment of these simplified
rules, smaller employers sponsoring 401(k) plans were subject to the same special non-
discrimination rules as larger employers.3"a Yet despite the reduced and uncertain level
of benefits available to highly compensated employees and the increased administrative
burden, 401(k) plans became the retirement plan of choice among smaller employers.'
297. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994).
298. See discussion supra Part I.A. There are exceptions that aggregate level data will mask. A classic
example is the law firm retirement plan that covers only partners of the firm and staff, but excludes associate
attorneys. See ALI-ABA, Pension, Profit-Sharing, Welfare, and Other Compensation Plans, Vol. I, 355
(March 22-24) (case study example of retirement program for law firm).
299. See sources cited supra note 19 and accompanying Table 1 (Coverage Rates by Occupation).
300. See Medill, supra note 21, at 7-9.
301. See sources cited supra note 77 and accompanying text.
302. See id.
303. See discussion supra text and accompanying notes 124-127. For an example of the complex legal
and accounting analysis that may be used to minimize the effects of a 401'(k) plan with a "bad" ADP testing
result, see the case study in ALI-ABA, supra note 298, at 377-392.
304. See Medill, supra note 21, at 7.
305. See Stretching the Pension Dollar, supra note 40, at 9.
306. See infra note 358 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 142-143.
308. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
309. See 1994 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 9, Table D.4 at 48; SMALL PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 11, at 78.
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The inability of the traditional approach to explain recent trends in pension plan
sponsorship and coverage design makes it an inappropriate foundation for pension re-
form legislation. One fundamental flaw is its failure to recognize and incorporate the
traditional employee recruitment and retention functions of employer-sponsored benefit
plans."' A second fundamental flaw is its monolithic and overly simplistic analysis of
the employer's motivations for sponsoring a retirement plan. A more sophisticated theo-
retical analysis would view employers as making a multi-faceted business decision in a
specific business context. The targeted reform theory utilizes this more sophisticated
approach.
B. A Theoretical Foundation For Targeted Pension Reform
The targeted reform theory is based on the premise that the employer's decision-
making process for plan sponsorship and coverage design, and the factors that influence
those decisions, will vary according to the employer's legal structure. Legal structure has
two key components under the targeted reform theory. First, legal structure may deter-
mine how the business entity is taxed. Second, legal structure determines the employer's
mechanisms for entity governance. The targeted reform theory describes how both of
these components play a critical role in the employer's decision-making process for plan
sponsorship and coverage design.
Why focus on legal structure and its implications for decision-making? The decision
to sponsor or amend a retirement plan is one that voluntarily must be made by the em-
ployer.3 ' How does an employer legally act? What motivates the employer to voluntar-
ily sponsor a plan, and to include and exclude various groups of employees from plan
coverage? By focusing on the taxation and governance aspects of the employer's legal
structure, the targeted reform theory provides significant insights into the answers to
these fundamental questions.
The discussion below develops the targeted reform theory of how the employer's
particular legal structure influences retirement plan coverage. It describes and analyzes
three different business legal structures selected as representative models of the range of
employers in the United States.3 t First, I examine publicly traded corporations, the area
where corporate governance theory has been the most well-developed by scholars." 3
310. See MCGILL, supra note 63, at 442-51; infra notes 348-350 and accompanying text; Halperin, supra
note 9, at 3, 8-11.
311. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
312. My categories of representative employers are consistent with the analysis used by corporate gov-
ernance scholars. Allan Blake categorizes companies based on their type of ownership. Blake's categories of
"family," "quasi-partnership," and "entrepreneur" correspond to my owner-employee business and closely held
corporation models, supra Parts Lll.B.2.-3. His category of "listed" companies and "subsidiaries within a group
of companies" correspond to my publicly traded corporation model and its "M-form" variant, supra Part
IH.B. 1. Using these categories, Blake analyzes and compares the corporate governance role of board of direc-
tors in each of these categories. See ALLAN BLAKE, DYNAMIC DIRECTORS, 27-27, 37 (1999). Abbass Alkafaji
divides privately held companies into two types. See ABBASs F. ALKAFAJI, A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH TO
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 17 (1989). His "owner-managed" and "family-owned" private companies corre-
spond to my owner-employee business and closely held corporation models. See id.
313. See generally CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson & Mike Wright, ed.
1997); ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, WATCHING THE WATCHERS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR
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Next, I examine employers that are owned by a single or small number of persons, and
that are organized as conduit entities for taxation purposes ("owner-employee busi-
nesses"). Finally, I examine non-publicly traded corporations having both majority and
minority shareholders ("closely held corporations").
1. Publicly Traded Corporations
The publicly traded corporation model has two distinguishing characteristics. First, a
publicly traded corporation is treated for tax purposes as a separate taxable entity.314
Second, the publicly traded corporation is operated by professional managers who are
distinct from the numerous shareholders who own the business.315 A shareholder-elected
board of directors is responsible for overseeing the professional managers of the busi-
ness.
316
Publicly traded corporations are likely to fall within the category of larger employers
having 100 or more employees." 7 The data indicate that these employers generally do
sponsor retirement plans, but these plans are designed to exclude certain groups of
workers, in particular low-income workers, from coverage. 1 8
If a publicly traded corporation were to amend its established retirement plan to in-
clude more workers, what legal action would be necessary? For reasons of ERISA fidu-
ciary liability, plan amendments are made (or at least ratified) by a resolution approved
by the board of directors of the corporation.1 9 What motivates action by the board of
directors in a publicly traded corporation? Corporate law posits that because the board
members are the elected representatives of the shareholders, the board should take ac-
tions that ensure the corporation is financially successful, thereby maximizing share-
holder value.32 ° In reality, directors of many publicly traded corporations traditionally
were (and some still are) "passive." These passive boards act only at the recommenda-
THE 21ST CENTURY (1996); Sanjai Bhagut, Dennis C. Corey & Charles M. Elson, Director Ownership, Corpo-
rate Performance, and Management Turnover, 54 BUS. LAW. 885 (1999).
314. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT,
TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, REPORTERS' STUDY, 67-68 (George K. Yin & David J. Sha-
kow, Reporters) (July 1999) (describing entity versus conduit theories of taxation of business enterprises).
Under current law, certain publicly traded firms organized as partnerships may be separately taxed as corpora-
tions under Subchapter C of the Code. See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); REPORTERS' STUDY,
supra, at 57-58, 117-18.
315. See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY, 4-5 (1932); Bhagut, Carey & Elson, supra note 313, at 886-887; Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corpo-
rate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership Lens: A Tool To Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 153, 158-59 (2000).
316. See 8 Del. Code § 141(a); R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Delaware Law of Corpo-
rations and Business Organizations, § 4.1 (3rd Ed. 1998); Berle & Means, supra note 315, at 69-70, 220;
Bhagut, Carey & Elson, supra note 313, at 891.
317. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
318. See discussion supra Part I.A.
319. Plan amendment by the employer is a settlor function that is not subject to fiduciary liability under
ERISA. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443-44(1999); Lockheed Corp. v. Spinks, 517
U.S. 882, 890 (1996); Curtis-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (noting that an employer
or other plan sponsor is "generally free under ERISA... to adopt, modify or terminate welfare plans."). ERISA
recognizes traditional principles of corporate law that a corporation "acts" through its board of directors or
authorized agents. Curtis-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 77-81.
320. See DYNAMIC DIRECTORS, supra note 312, at 27-29; Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders As Grown-
Ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on the Board's Power to Just Say No, "67 U. CIN. L. REV. 990, 1005 (1999).
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tion of the top management executives of the corporation, typically the chief executive
officer.
3 21
In the modem publicly traded corporation, the interests of top level management are
not naturally aligned with the interests of the shareholders in maximizing shareholder
wealth.322 Corporate governance theory323 has sparked a movement among shareholders
of publicly traded corporations to remedy this problem. Executive compensation plans
are designed to create incentives that tie compensation of the corporation's top level
management to share value.324 Outside directors are encouraged, or in some instances
required, to invest substantial sums in the stock of the corporation.3 25 These trends, com-
bined with the growing importance of the institutional investor,3 26 have led to an intensi-
fied focus by both executive management and directors on the short-term financial per-
formance of the publicly traded corporation.3 27 This intense pressure to boost short-term
321. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 315, at 89; Bhugart, Carey & Elson, supra note 313, at 887-891.
322. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 315, at 121-22.
323. The meaning and scope of the term "corporate governance" varies widely. "In its narrowest sense,
the term may describe the formal system of accountability of senior management to the shareholders. At its
most expansive the term is stretched to include the entire network of formal and informal relations involving
the corporate sector and their consequences for society in general." Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson & Mike
Wright, Introduction: The Corporate Governance Problem--Competing Diagnoses and Solutions, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 313, at 2. Monks and Minow define corporate governance as "the
relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations."
MONKS & MINOW, supra note 313, at xvii. They define the "primary" participants as shareholders, manage-
ment, and the board of directors. See id. A more recent variant of corporate governance theory, the "stake-
holder" theory, would require the corporation's board of directors to take into account a broader range of
constituent interests, whether or not these interests were related to share value. See BLAKE, supra note 312, at
27-29; see generally ALKAFAJI, supra note 312.
324. See BLAKE, supra note 312, at 143; Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth F. Martin, The Effect of Share-
holder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CiN. L. REv. 1021, 1030-31 (1999); Jennifer G. Hill,
Deconstructing Sunbeam--Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1099, 1120
(1999); Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 Hous. L. REV.
399, 413 (1998); Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation Positively
Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. REV. 227, 233-38 (1999).
325. See Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board--The History of
a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (1996); The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership,
63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649 (1995); Hill, supra note 324, at 1112 ("directors [of Sunbeam Corporation] were
required to purchase a 'significant tranche' of Sunbeam stock from their own funds before then appointment to
the board").
326. See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 313, at 106-19; William B. Chandler HI, On the Instructiveness
of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1088-91 (1999); Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 567-70 (1990); Bernard S. Black & John C.
Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1997, 2078 (1994); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly Into the Twenty-
First Century, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 423 (1996). Chandler, a leading jurist on the Delaware Court of Chancery,
defines institutional investors as "those stock- and debt-holding groups or entities that actively invest on behalf
of others. Among the entities that might fall into this category are: pension funds; mutual funds; venture and
vulture capital partnerships; insurance companies; and commercial banks and other financial institutions."
Chandler, supra, at 1083, note 3.
327. See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 313, at 106-19, 232-38 (explaining why various types of institu-
tional investors and corporate management are focused on short-term corporate performance); Chandler, supra
note 326, at 1092-93; Thomas & Martin, supra note 324, at 1035 (mutual fund shareholders focus on liquidity
of investments and their short-term performance); Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate
Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1893 (1992) (noting that institutional investors are
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corporate earnings characterizes the publicly traded corporation of today.3 28 I propose
that it also strongly influences employer decisions concerning retirement plan coverage.
The traditional approach to pension reform assumes that the management decision
makers for the employer are motivated to sponsor qualified plans in order to obtain pref-
erential tax benefits for themselves. As an initial observation, the millions of dollars in
compensation paid to many chief executives and other senior officers of publicly traded
corporations make laughable the idea that higher qualified plan benefit limits will moti-
vate their decisions.3 29 Putting this observation aside, according to the underlying logic
of the traditional approach, the retirement plans of publicly traded corporations should
tend to cover only the highest and lowest-paid employees. This coverage design is the
least costly way to obtain the qualified plan benefits for the highly compensated man-
agement employees.330 But the empirical data indicate that this is not how larger corpo-
rations appear to act. 331 Large corporations tend to exclude from their retirement plans
the "cheapest" workers (low-income workers) and include the most "expensive" workers
to cover (those who are at the higher end of the non-highly compensated employee
compensation scale).332 Why this approach? An alternative explanation is that the pub-
licly traded corporation will target the most marginalized, lowest-skilled segments of its
workforce for exclusion. It is this population of workers who are the least valuable to the
operation of the business and whose resulting job dissatisfaction is least likely to impact
corporate profits adversely in the short term.
Publicly traded corporations compete in the national labor market for the limited
pool of educated and highly-skilled employees who are vital to the financial success of
the business.333 To be able to attract and retain these valued workers, the employer must
offer retirement plan benefits to them. To not do so would put the employer at a com-
unwilling to invest in corporate governance changes that have uncertain immediate returns); Susan J. Stabile,
Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 81, 88-89 (describ-
ing tax Code incentives for shift from salaries to stock options and other performance-based compensation for
executives of public corporations); Thomas & Martin, supra note 324, at 1029 (describing dramatic growth of
the value of stock option grants to corporate executives).
328. Indeed, the pressure today for public corporations to meet Wall Street earnings expectations is so
great that Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levit publicly commented that it may
be leading to accounting manipulation bordering on fraud. See Hill, supra note 324, at 1124-25. At the urging
of the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers volun-
tarily formed a committee ("Committee") to investigate SEC concerns with corporate financing reporting
practices. See Ira M. Millstein, Introduction to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commit-
tee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 Bus. LAW. 1057, 1057-58 (1999). The
Committee determined the SEC's concerns with the quality of corporate financial reporting were real, and
were "primarily fueled by a perceived need for corporations to constantly 'make the numbers'--to match or
exceed analysts' expectations and projections." Id. at 1059. The NYSE has adopted the recommended reforms
of the committee and requires compliance by its member corporations.
329. Compare Stabile, supra note 327, at 81-82 and notes 1-5 (describing compensation of chief execu-
tives and senior officers), with Table 4 (Proposals to Change the Limitations Rules), supra notes 150-162
(proposed upper limits for benefits and contributions for participants in qualified plans). See generally GRAEF
S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991).
330. This is because both the benefits payable to each participant in a defined benefit plan and the contri-
butions made by the employer for each participant are a function of and limited by the participant's compensa-
tion. See I.R.C. §§ 404, 415 (1994). The lower the level of the participant's compensation, the lesser the level
of.benefits payable or contributions made in absolute dollars for that participant.
331. See Table 1 (Coverage Rates by Occupation), supra note 19.
332. See id.
333. See MCGILL ET. AL., supra note 63, at 339.
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petitive disadvantage, because its competitors are offering retirement plan benefits as
part of their compensation package offers.3" For purposes of the pension tax law rules
for plan coverage, this group of workers will tend to be either highly-compensated em-
ployees or those workers who are at the higher end of the non-highly compensated em-
ployee compensation scale.335 In contrast, there is a greatly reduced employer demand
for part-time workers or low-skilled workers. Retirement plan benefits are much less
essential for the publicly traded corporation to fill these positions.336
How the publicly traded corporation arrives at the coverage design of its retirement
plan also will be determined by its particular business history. Significant events in the
corporation's business history, such as the purchase or sale of subsidiaries or divisions,
the unionization of its workforce, or the growth and expansion of its business can pro-
voke a reexamination of retirement plan coverage to determine whether the plan contin-
ues to satisfy the tax rules for qualified plans.337 Each such reexamination, and if neces-
sary, plan amendment(s), will be sparked by some change in the underlying business
operations. An expansion of plan coverage will increase the corporation's operating
expenses in the form of additional administrative costs and/or increased employer con-
tributions to the plan. Increased expenses will reduce corporate earnings. This adverse
impact on corporate earnings makes it highly unlikely that the publicly traded corpora-
tion will expand the scope of retirement plan coverage to cover low-income workers
beyond the minimum legal requirements mandated by the pension tax laws.
In a publicly traded corporation with a passive board of directors, the board acts only
at the initiative and upon the recommendation of the top-level management.3 Due to
the structure of their executive compensation packages, top-level management are
unlikely to recommend any action with a detrimental effect on short-terms corporate
profits. Increasing plan coverage will result in an immediate, definite and easily quanti-
fied increase in the operating expenses of the business. The short term impact on corpo-
rate profits will be a negative one.
Expanding plan coverage to low-income workers can improve productivity and
thereby boost corporate profits in the longer term. These benefits result from higher
levels of job satisfaction, higher employee morale, lower rates of employee turnover,
and a mechanism to encourage older, less productive workers to retire. 3 9 But such bene-
ficial effects are difficult to estimate in terms of dollars and, most important of all, will
334. See id.; see generally Mandelker, supra note 41, at 74 (describing intense competition among
employers for high-tech employees).
335. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
336. Offering retirement benefits to low-income workers may actually make it more difficult for the cor-
poration to fill these positions because this group is least likely to accept any reduction in current wages in
exchange for retirement plan benefits. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 14.
337. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. Large public corporations tend to divide into multiple divisions,
each with its own separate administrative and managerial employees. See Hicheon Kim & Robert E. Hoskis-
son, Market (United States) Versus Managed (Japanese) Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 313 at CHAP. 8, 174-78; ALKAFASI, supra note 312, at 19. This "M-form" organizational structure makes
the large public corporation uniquely suited to take advantage of the separate line of business exception to the
coverage rules. See sources cited supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
338. See Stabile, supra note 315, at 170 n. 77.
339. See MCGILL ET.AL., supra note 63, at 461-77; LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 53, at 29-32.
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become evident only in the long term. In a fast-paced, ever changing business environ-
ment driven by last quarter's reported earnings, a benefit that will not materialize until
several years in the future is simply too long to wait.
For similar reasons, even a publicly traded corporation with an activist board of di-
rectors is unlikely to initiate expanded pension coverage for low-income workers. The
intricacies of qualified plan coverage design and the pension tax laws are likely to be
beyond the expertise of most directors.34 Outside directors in particular are unlikely to
have the time, information, inclination, and expertise necessary to raise the issue of ex-
panding the coverage under employer's retirement plan.34 ' Activist shareholder groups,
particularly institutional investors, put continual pressure on board members to boost
short-term corporate financial performance. 42 Even for those directors who have a sig-
nificant personal investment in the corporation's stock, 3" the uncertain financial impact
on the corporation of expanding plan coverage is likely to deter such initiatives.
In summary, the targeted reform theory indicates answers to two key questions in the
publicly traded corporation setting. It explains why a publicly traded corporation will
exclude low-income workers from qualified plan coverage. It also explains why a pub-
licly traded corporation is unlikely to expand pension coverage voluntarily beyond the
minimum level required by the pension tax laws. The pressure for short-term corporate
earnings constrains any attempt by management, directors, and institutional shareholders
to voluntarily expand pension coverage. Only governmental compulsion, in the form of
more inclusive minimum coverage requirements under the pension tax laws, will moti-
vate the publicly traded corporation to expand pension coverage to low-income workers.
Congress can compel expanded retirement plan coverage by amending the coverage
rules for qualified plans. Such amendments would bring into sharp conflict the inherent
tension between employer choice and governmental regulation in a system dependent
upon voluntary plan sponsorship by employers. I confront this persistent policy dilemma
in Part III.C, and show why a fear of plan terminations by employers in response to
more inclusive coverage rules is unrealistic.
2. Owner-Employee Businesses
The owner-employee business model has two distinguishing characteristics. First,
for federal income tax purposes it is generally treated as a "conduit" rather than sepa-
rately taxed. Tax items of the entity "flow through" to its owners and are taken into ac-
count directly by the owner(s).' Second, in the owner-employee business model, the
340. See supra note 111 and accompanying text; cf Stabile, supra note 315, at 170 n. 74. ("Board mem-
bers sitting on a company's compensation committee are generally not compensation experts. Typically, board
members include university deans, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals who may or may not have signifi-
cant business experience but who rarely possess any expertise in compensation matters.") As Professor Stabile
has pointed out, in addition to a lack of expertise, outside directors of large publicly traded corporations also
may be under significant time constraints. See id. at 175-76 & n. 95.
341. See ALKAFASI, supra note 312, at 51-52.
342. See sources cited supra notes 327-328. The irony of this situation is that by far the largest group of
institutional investors, in terms of asset holdings, are in fact private pension funds. See MONKS & MINOW,
supra note 313, at 106, 119.
343. See sources cited supra note 326.
344. See REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 314, at 43, 67-68. Employers treated as conduits for taxation
purposes include entities taxed under subchapter K of the Code and entities that have elected to be governed
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owner is also the top managerial (and likely the highest paid) employee of the
business.345
The unique governance characteristic of owner-employee business model is the unity
of ownership and management. As both controlling owner and top management em-
ployee, one individual (or a small group of individuals)346 decides whether the business
will sponsor a retirement plan. What motivates the owner-employee of a business to
sponsor a retirement plan? A recent survey of smaller employers helps answer this ques-
tion. 47 The two most important reasons cited by survey respondents for sponsoring a
retirement plan were first the competitive advantage plan sponsorship gave the business
in recruiting and retaining employees, and second the positive effect on employee atti-
tude and performance.348 The third most significant reason cited by smaller employers
was the moral obligation of employers to provide a retirement plan for their
employees.34 9 According to survey respondents, the tax benefits to employees in general,
under subchapter S of the Code ("S corporations"). See id. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 1992
there were a total of 3,135,000 sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations employing a total of
27,403,000 employees. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Statistics about Small Business and Large Business from
the U.S. Census Bureau, Table 4 (visited Oct. 3, 2000) <http:lwww.census.gov/epcdlwww/smallbus.html>.
To elect S corporation status, a corporation must be a domestic corporation with only one class of stock
having no more than 75 shareholders. All shareholders must be either individuals, estates or certain permitted
trusts, and no shareholder may be a nonresident alien. See I.R.C. § 1361 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Prior to
1996, the number of permitted shareholders was 35. See JAMES S. EUSTICE & JOEL D. KUNTZ, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS, 11 3.04[1] at 3-90 (3rd Ed. 1993). Maine estimates that as of 1997 S
corporations constituted 48% of all corporations in the United States. See Jeffrey A. Maine, Evaluating Sub-
chapter S In a 'Check-The-Box" World, 51 TAX LAW. 717, 724-25 (1998). Domestic limited liability compa-
nies are taxed as partnerships unless they affirmatively elect to be taxed as S or C corporations. See Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1 (as amended in 1996); Maine, supra, at 726-35. Due to recent tax regulatory develop-
ments, in the future limited liability companies taxed as partnerships under Subchapter K are likely to grow in
importance. See id. at 730-35. For a comparison of the taxation features of Subchapters K and S, see
REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 314, Table 1 at 129-30.
345. See ALKAFASI, supra note 312, at 17. In his study of individual income tax returns reporting partner-
ship or subchapter S net income, Yin found that only 6% of the returns reported having an adjusted gross
income of less than $40,000, which represents a rough proxy for individual taxpayers in the 15% or lower tax
bracket. See George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 144, 180-182
(1999). Using 1994 tax return data, Yin and Shakow estimated that roughly 62.6% of returns reporting part-
nership or S corporation income were filed by taxpayers in the 28% or higher income tax bracket. See
REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 314, at 139-42. When analyzed as a percentage of net income, only 6% of
total partnership or S corporation net income was reported by taxpayers in the 15% of lower income tax
bracket. See id. at 143-45.
346. As of 1997, 51% of all S corporations in the United States had only one shareholder. See Maine, su-
pra note 344, at 724-25. Another example of the owner-employee business model is a "family company"
where ownership is limited to the members of a family who also work in the business. See BLAKE, supra note
312, at 99.
347. Employee Benefit Research Institute, supra note 12.
348. See id. at 6-7 and Table 2. Thirty-three percent of employers cited competitive advantage in em-
ployee retention and recruitment as the most important reason to sponsor a retirement plan, and sixty percent
(60%) cited it as a major reason. Twenty-eight percent (28%) of employers cited the positive effect on em-
ployee attitude and performance as the most important reason to sponsor a retirement plan, and seventy-one
percent (7 1%) cited it as a major reason.
349. See id. Twelve percent of employers cited this moral obligation as the most important reason to
sponsor a retirement plan, and twenty-nine percent (29%) cited it as a major reason. This response is particu-
larly interesting because it is not captured by an analysis based on economically rational decision-making.
This third reason is consistent, however, with the consolidation of ownership and management in one individ-
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and the tax benefits to "key" employees of the business, were much less important rea-
sons to sponsor a retirement plan.35°
The survey also provides insights into why owner-employee businesses chose not to
sponsor a retirement plan. Contrary to the traditional approach, the survey found that
"[t]here are a number of reasons why more small employers do not offer retirement
plans--it is not simply a matter of administrative cost and burden."35" ' One major reason
is that business revenues are too uncertain to commit to a plan.352 The other major reason
is lack of employee demand for a retirement plan. If the employer has a large number of
seasonal, part-time, or high-turnover employees, or the employees prefer wages or other
types of employer-provided benefits to retirement plan benefits, the employer is unlikely
to choose to sponsor a retirement plan.353
The taxation and governance characteristics of the owner-employee business model
explain these survey results. The owner-employee's personal income is directly linked to
ual and the likely influence of the individual's personal values on business decision-making. It may also reflect
the family-owned nature of many of these types of businesses.
350. Employment Benefit Research Institute, supra note 12, at 6-7 and Table 2. Only seven percent (7%)
of employers cited the tax advantages to employees as the most important reason to sponsor a retirement plan,
and six percent (6%) of employers cited the tax advantages to key employees as the most important reason to
sponsor a retirement plan. Thirty-eight percent (38%) cited the tax advantages to employees as a major reason,
and twenty-five percent (25%) cited the tax advantages to key employees as a major reason.
A simple cost-benefit analysis explains why the immediate income tax benefits alone are unlikely to per-
suade an owner-employee to sponsor a retirement plan. The maximum annual contribution the owner-
employee can make to a 401(k) plan is a salary deferral limited to $6,000 if a SIMPLE plan is used, or $10,000
if a safe harbor 401(k) plan is selected. The owner-employee will realize a minimal immediate savings in his
income taxes due to the contribution. Assuming the owner-employee is in a 40% marginal income tax bracket
(combined federal and state), on a $6,000 SIMPLE plan contribution the owner-employee will have an income
tax savings of $2,400.
What is the "cost" to the owner-employee of sponsoring the plan and obtaining this "tax benefit"? For ei-
ther type of 401(k) plan design selected, to make the maximum annual contribution the owder-employee must
contribute a "safe harbor" amount to the 401(k) plan. Assuming the owner-employee selects the most simple
safe harbor to administer, the owner-employee must contribute an amount roughly equal to 3% of compensa-
tion for the employees of the business who are eligible to participate in the 401(k) plan. In addition, the owner-
employee will incur administrative expenses for sponsoring the plan. Taken together, these two factors consti-
tute the "costs" to the owner-employee of sponsoring the plan. Because the business is treated as a conduit
entity for tax purposes, these costs directly reduce the personal income of the owner-employee.
By choosing not to sponsor a 401(k) plan, the owner-employee also will "save" the "costs" of contribu-
tions for the other eligible employees and plan administration. Again, because tax items of the business are
accounted for by the owner individually, these "savings" directly increase the personal income of the owner-
employee.
Simple math indicates that the immediate income tax savings to the owner-employee are very likely to be
overwhelmed by the countervailing immediate costs of employer contributions and plan administration. Even
assuming that the plan's administrative costs are zero, once the payroll costs for the owner-employee's other
employees exceed $80,000, the costs of contributions to the plan for those employees will exceed the owner-
employee's personal immediate income tax savings from sponsoring the plan.
351. Id. at 4. Only fifteen percent (15%) of employers indicated that the most important reason for not
sponsoring a retirement plan was that it cost too much to set up and administer or that there were too many
government regulations. See id. at 5.
352. See id. at 5 and Table 1. Nineteen percent (19%) of employers cited revenues as the most important
reason for not sponsoring a retirement plan. Fifty percent (50%) of employers cited revenues as a major reason
they did not sponsor a retirement plan.
353. See id. Nineteen percent (19%) of employers cited seasonal, part-time, or high-tumover workers as
the most important reason for not sponsoring a plan, and forty-two percent (42%) listed it as a major reason.
Seventeen percent (17%) of employers cited an employee preference for wages or other benefits as the most
important reason not to sponsor a retirement plan, and fifty-three percent (53%) cited it as a major reason.
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the financial success of the business. To increase her personal earnings, the owner-
employee must grow and expand the business in a profitable manner. Business growth
and expansion, however, require capital. Business revenues can be used directly to fi-
nance expansion. Business revenues also allow the owner-employee to service debt
incurred to finance business expansion. Under either scenario, the owner-employee is
unlikely to divert and commit business revenues to a retirement plan for employees
during the growth and expansion stage of the business.
At some point in the development of the business, the revenues of the.business will
reach a level where the owner-employee perceives she has a broader range of options. I
refer to this stage as having reached the "revenue threshold."3" The owner-employee can
distribute excess revenues355 to herself as personal income. Alternatively, she can use
excess revenues in ways that are likely to make her business continue to grow and ex-
pand in the future. If the owner-employee senses that recruiting and retaining educated
and highly-skilled employees is in her long-term financial interest, she will try to make
her business an attractive workplace for these types of employees. She will have to do so
to be competitive on the national labor market for these types of highly sought-after
workers." 6 Competition among employers in the form of retirement benefits for these
workers will require the owner-employee to "invest" part of her excess revenues in a
retirement plan. In contrast, if the employees of the business are low-income workers,
the owner-employee may perceive that investing in a retirement plan for these employ-
ees will not promote her financial self-interest. The owner-employee is much less likely
to need a retirement plan to attract and retain these types of workers.357 What factors
would motivate the owner-employee who does not sponsor a retirement plan to sponsor
one? There is not a monolithic answer to this question. Two obvious variables would be
where the business lies in the development cycle, and the level and consistency of busi-
ness revenues.
Some congistent level of revenue is necessary to sustain even the administrative
costs of a pure 401(k) plan having no employer contributions. Owner-employee busi-
nesses in the initial stages of growth and expansion are likely to experience fluctuations
in revenues from year to year. An owner-employee whose business revenues are below
the minimum threshold cannot afford a retirement plan, even if she would like to spon-
sor one.
A different analysis applies to an owner-employee business that is approaching, but
has not yet consistently reached, the revenue threshold. Assuming the owner-employee
has decided to sponsor a retirement plan once it becomes affordable, offering a tax credit
for the initial start-up costs will lower the requisite revenue threshold for the first two
354. I do not attempt to assign a.dollar amount to the revenue threshold because it will likely vary with
both the expenses of the business and with the individual perceptions of owner-employees.
355. Rather than attempting to define the term "profit" in a financial accounting reporting sense, through-
out my analysis I use the term "excess revenues" to connote available cash resources that the employer could
allocate to a variety of uses, including a contribution to a retirement plan. A "profit" in the financial accounting
sense is not a prerequisite to making an employer contribution to a qualified plan, even to a "profit-sharing"
plan. See Rev. Rul. 66-174, 1966-1 C. B. 81.
356. See MCGILL, supra note 63, at 339.
357. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
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years of plan sponsorship. For businesses in this transitional category, the 401(k) plan is
likely to be the employer's first choice as an "entry-level" retirement plan." 8 The 401(k)
plan is attractive because it does not require employer contributions to the plan. Thus the
employer's costs of plan sponsorship are limited to administrative costs covered by the
tax credit.
A third category of owner-employee businesses consists of businesses that have
reached or perhaps surpassed the revenue threshold, but the owner-employee chooses
not to sponsor a retirement plan. For this category, worker demand for a retirement plan
is likely strongly to influence the owner-employee's decision.359 One way to stimulate
employee demand is through an intensive program of sustained and broad-based public
education.3" Such a program would emphasize the need for retirement savings to sup-
plement Social Security benefits for a financially secure retirement. In addition, public
education could reinforce the apparent moral obligation some individual owner-
employees feel to provide a retirement plan for their employees. 6 Finally, smaller em-
ployers in general are unfamiliar with their options for sponsoring different types of
retirement plans. 362 A program of public education making smaller employers more
knowledgeable of the various options for retirement plans could positively impact plan
sponsorship among this group.
Will these public education programs ultimately expand retirement plan coverage
among low-income workers? Low-income workers in general are likely to be less edu-
cated and less knowledgeable about financial planning for retirement.363 Public educa-
tion programs certainly could be designed to target low-income workers and raise their
awareness, of the need to save for retirement. Workers in general tend to discount the
future benefits provided through a retirement plan. An effective program of public edu-
cation would cause low-income workers to place a higher value on, and thus increase
demand for, retirement plan benefits. Such increased knowledge and awareness may or
may not translate into increased demand for retirement benefits among low-income
workers. Other current financial responsibilities may make it impossible for the low-
income worker to save through a 401(k) plan. For this reason, raising plan contribution
and benefit limits (the traditional approach to pension reform) is unlikely to stimulate
demand for retirement plan benefits among low-income workers. Low-income workers
are the least able to forgo even more current income in exchange for greater retirement
plan benefits. Although they may desire retirement plan benefits, they may need current
income even more.
358. The empirical data indicate that the vast majority of smaller employers who choose to sponsor a re-
tirement plan select a 401(k) plan. See 1994 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 9, Table D.4 at 48;
Employee Benefit Research Institute, supra note 12, at 6-7 (67% of small employers sponsor 401(k) plans).
Oftentimes a 401(k) plan will be the only retirement plan sponsored by these employers. See 1994 FORM 5500
ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 9, Table D.4 at 48.
359. See supra notes 351-353 and accompanying text.
360. Empirical research indicates that materials provided by the employer to educate employees on re-
tirement savings result in higher levels of retirement savings. See The Evolution of Retirement, supra note 21,
at 15. Although the Department of Labor has begun to make retirement savings information available to the
public, the scope of this program is limited. See Medill, supra note 21, at 49-50 (criticizing the Savings.Are
Vital to Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997 as unlikely to promote changes in retirement savings behavior).
361. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
362. See Employment Benefit Research Institute, supra note 12, at 8-9.
363. See Medill, supra note 21, at 16.
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Note how the owner-employee with a "mixed" workforce of highly-skilled and low-
income employees faces a dilemma. Among her pool of rank-and-file (non-highly com-
pensated) employees, the higher paid workers demand retirement plan benefits. The
low-income workers are unwilling to give up current compensation for retirement plan
benefits. If the owner-employee had a sizeable workforce, under the coverage rules for
qualified plans she might accommodate the interests of both groups by including the
more highly paid rank-and-file workers in the plan and excluding the low-income work-
ers from plan coverage. 3" But many owner-employees are unlikely to have a sufficient
number of employees for this strategy to be successful.365
How does the owner-employee solve her dilemma? She sponsors a 401(k) plan. A
401(k) plan easily satisfies the coverage rules for qualified plans. Under the coverage
rules,
all of the rank-and-file employees are treated as included in the plan if they are eligi-
ble to make salary deferral contributions, even if they never do so.366 The higher-paid
rank-and-file employees are satisfied. As non-highly compensated employees, they are
not subject to the constraints of nondiscrimination testing.367 Therefore this group can
contribute the maximum allowable amount to the 401(k) plan in the form of salary de-
ferrals.368 The low-income workers too are satisfied. They choose not to make salary
deferrals and receive all of their compensation as current income.
This analysis illustrates the difficulties of crafting targeted pension reform legislation
in the context of the owner-employee business model. The key to enhancing the retire-
ment income security of low-income workers in this setting is to encourage the owner-
employee to move beyond an entry-level 401(k) plan to a retirement plan requiring sig-
nificant employer contributions.369 At a minimum, the pension tax laws governing quali-
364. See discussion supra Part I.B.
365. See discussion supra Part I.B.
366. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
367. See sources cited supra note 126.
368. See sources cited supra note 126.
369. Because the owner-employee business is taxed as a conduit, it may be difficult (and perhaps futile)
to create tax-based incentives to encourage smaller employers to sponsor plans requiring significant employer
contributions. Many owner-employees will receive a greater share of the after-tax profits of the business by
taking them as personal income rather than sponsoring and contributing as an employer to a qualified plan.
The example below illustrates this point using as an alternative option a basic profit sharing plan that allocates
employer contributions pro rata based on compensation.
Assume the owner-employee of an S corporation takes $1.00 of the excess revenues as personal income.
At a 40% combined federal and state marginal income tax rate, he pays 40 cents in income taxes and pockets
60 cents. If he instead contributes the $1.00 of excess revenues to a profit sharing plan, 60 cents or more will
be allocated to his plan account only if his compensation is equal to or exceeds 60% of all participants in the
profit sharing plan.
As the payroll of the business grows, the owner-employee's pro rata share of total compensation will
shrink. By the time the business has reached a level of revenues that the owner-employee is ready to consider
something more than a 401(k) plan, his proportionate share of any employer contribution to the plan will have
declined. I recognize that this example could be criticized as overly simplistic. The true value for comparison
purposes of the owner-employee's plan contribution should incorporate such factors as the rate of return, the
value of compounding tax-deferred earnings, and the length of time the contribution will remain in the plan.
The combination of these factors will increase the economic value of the owner-employer's plan contribution
option vis-a-vis his after-tax alternative option for distributing business revenues. My response to such poten-
tial criticism is two-fold. First, these factors cannot be known with certainty by the owner-employee. Second,
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fied plans should not operate to deter this type of transition. I argue later in Part III.C
that the new pension tax policy trend of differentiating among employers on the basis of
size may in fact have just such a deterrent effect. 370
3. Closely Held Corporations
The closely held corporation. model bears a superficial resemblance to the publicly
traded corporation.37" ' Like the publicly traded corporation model, the closely held cor-
poration model is taxed separately.372 It is usually governed by a board of directors
elected by its shareholders.373 The characteristic that distinguishes between the closely
held corporation model from the publicly traded corporation model, discussed previ-
ously, is that in the closely held corporation there is a substantial natural alignment of
interests between majority ownership and management of the business.374
In the publicly traded corporation model, share ownership is widely dispersed, and
shares are traded on a public market. The numerous shareholders essentially play no role
in the management of the business. 375 In contrast, the closely held corporation model
assumes that there is no public market for shares of the business. Share ownership is
concentrated among a discrete group who own or control at least 51% of the voting
stock of the corporation ("controlling shareholders").376 At least some of these control-
ling shareholders also are employees of the business. Thus, the governance characteris-
tics of the closely held corporation more closely resemble the owner-employee business
model. Because at least some of the controlling shareholders are employees of the busi-
ness, there is a stronger degree of natural incentive alignment between the top-level
management employees of the business and its controlling sharehoIders. In addition, the
closely held corporation, like the owner-employee business, is not subject to public
market pressures to meet earnings expectations and distribute dividends to shareholders.
The closely held corporation model differs from the owner-employee business model
in two significant respects. First, the closely held corporation model assumes there are
minority owners who are not involved in the management of the business as employees
("minority shareholders"). Second, in the closely held corporation model, the corpora-
the average owner-employee is unlikely to have the time or inclination to run various scenarios based on
assumed values for these factors. Instead, the owner-employee is likely to be concentrating his time and en-
ergy on operating his business. To overcome the economic disincentives to himself personally from making
employer contributions to the profit sharing plan, there must exist other, more compelling business reasons for
the business to sponsor something more than an entry-level 401(k) plan.
370. See discussion infra Part II.C.
371. See discussion supra Part IH.B. 1.
372. See sources cited supra note 314. The closely held corporation model assumes that the business is
taxed as a C corporation and is ineligible or has not elected to be taxed as an S corporation. See supra note 344
and accompanying text.
373. If state corporation law permits, the board may be abolished and the corporation governed directly
by its shareholders. See Del. Code Tit. 8, § 351 (1991); BALoTri & FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS, supra note 316, at § 14.7.
374. See Stabile, supra note 315, at 15 & n. 16 (asserting that, "In the close corporation context, the sharp
distinction [between shareholders and managers] is more likely to break down because shareholders typically
both own and manage the business.")
375. See sources cited supra note 315.
376. Under traditional state corporation law, a simple majority of the outstanding voting stock will pre-
vail, unless the corporation's certificate of incorporation or by-laws affirmatively require a higher percentage.
See Del. Code Tit. 8, § 216 (1991); BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 316, at § 7.23.
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tion's profits are subject to at least two levels of tax, once to the corporation and a sec-
ond time when distributed to the shareholders in the form of dividends.377 Under the
closely held corporation model, it is this combination of double taxation and the minor-
ity shareholder presence that plays a unique role in the employer's decisions concerning
retirement plan sponsorship and coverage design.
Minority shareholders exert a weak influence over business operational decisions in
general, and over decisions concerning retirement plan sponsorship and coverage design
in particular. American corporation law traditionally provides few rights to minority
shareholders.378 In a publicly traded corporation, minority shareholders at least can voice
their dissatisfaction with business management decisions by selling their shares on the
public market, the so-called "Wall Street Walk."3 79 Activist shareholder groups can at-
tempt to bring the interests of management into closer alignment by tying executive
compensation to share value.38° These options are not available to the minority share-
holders of a closely held corporation. There is no public market to value and sell their
shares. Even if a buyer can be found for the shares, they are likely to be sold at a sub-
stantial minority interest discount. 8
The presence of the minority shareholder is keenly felt, however, when the top man-
agement employees and controlling shareholders of the business attempt to distribute
excess revenues to themselves in the form of corporate dividends. If excess revenues are
distributed as corporate dividends, the net amount received by the controlling sharehold-
ers will be substantially reduced, first by double taxation, and second by the pro rata
share that must be paid to the minority shareholders. Example 7 below illustrates these
effects, based on assumed marginal corporation and personal income tax (combined
state and federal) rates of 40%, and a 25% minority shareholder interest.
Example 7
Assume the business has $1.00 of profit that the board of directors decidesto distrib-
ute as a dividend. How much of this $1.00 will end up in the pockets of the controlling
shareholders? First, the tax on corporation profits reduces the $1.00 by 40 cents. The
remaining 60 cents is distributed pro rata to all shareholders. One-fourth of the 60 cents
goes to the minority shareholders, leaving 45 cents for the controlling shareholders.
After paying personal income taxes at a marginal rate of 40%, the controlling sharehold-
ers net 27 cents.
Given the heavy transfer price imposed by double taxation and minority shareholder
"leakage," top-level management (who in my closely held corporation model coincide
with the group of controlling shareholders) may prefer to distribute excess revenues
377. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 301 (1994). A C corporation is taxed first on the profits of the business. When the
profits are distributed to shareholders as dividends, the dividends are taxed a second time as personal income
to the shareholders. See REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 314, at 42-43.
378. See Thompson, supra note 320, at 1001-1003; see generally F. Hodge O'Neal and Robert B.
Thompson, O'Neal's Oppression of Minority Shareholders, § 1:03 (2nd Ed. 1999).
379. See Thompson, supra note 320, at 1002; Chandler, supra note 326, at 1090.
380. See sources cited supra note 324.
381. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 378, at § 1:03.
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directly to themselves in the form of additional employee compensation." 2 There are
both legal and practical constraints on this strategy. Legally, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice is much more likely to seek to disallow a deduction for excessive compensation in
the context of a closely held corporation than in a publicly traded corporation setting.383
In addition, the courts are much more likely to entertain a challenge to executive com-
pensation brought by a minority shareholder of a closely held corporation than of a pub-
licly traded corporation. 4
Paying "compensation" to top-level management in the form of benefits from a
qualified plan avoids both of these constraints. Perhaps more importantly, it also elimi-
nates the heavy transfer price of the corporate dividend alternative, as illustrated by
Example 8 below:
Example 8
Assume the business contributes $1.00 of its excess revenues to a qualified profit-
sharing plan. Both the administrative costs of sponsoring the plan and the contribution
amount are deductible as business expenses of the corporation. The $1.00 is allocated to
the accounts of eligible employees pro rata based on compensation. The controlling
shareholders who are plan participants do not pay personal income tax on their share of
the contribution until it is withdrawn from the plan. Personal income tax on investment
earnings also is deferred until the funds are withdrawn from the account.
There is still leakage, but it is a different kind of leakage, in the qualified plan alter-
native for distributing excess revenues to the controlling shareholders. Under the non-
discrimination rules, the qualified plan must cover and provide benefits to rank-and-file
employees.383 The amount of "leakage" to rank-and-file employees, however, is reduced
by designing the qualified plan to take maximum advantage of the loopholes under the
382. See id. at § 3:07.
383. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Compensation of the Chief Executive Officer and Directors of Pub-
licly Held Corporations, ALI-ABA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTrruTE, 127 (SE39 ALI-ABA 103, Oct. 7,
1999). The IRS may challenge the compensation as a disguised dividend, see, e.g., O.S.C. & Assocs., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 187 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) or as "excessive" and therefore not deductible as a reasonable and
necessary business expense under Code Section 162(a), see Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 833
(7th Cir. 1999). Unlike in the publicly traded corporation model, the closely held corporation cannot shield
itself from an IRS challenge by obtaining shareholder approval of executive compensation under Code Section
162(m). See I.R.C. §§162(m)(l)-(2) (1994). The federal courts are divided over what test to use to determine
whether executive compensation is "excessive" and therefore not deductible under Code Section 162(a). See
Exacto Spring Corp., supra. Judge Posner describes the problem of evaluating the reasonableness of executive
compensation in the closely held corporation setting:
In the case of a publicly held corporation, where the salaries of the highest executives are fixed by a board
of directors that those executives do not control, the danger of siphoning corporate earnings to executives in
the form of salary is not acute. The danger is much greater in the case of a closely held corporation, in which
ownership and management tend to coincide; unfortunately, as the opinion of the Tax Court in this case illus-
trates, judges are not competent to decide what business executives are worth. Exacto Spring Corp., 196 F.3d
at 838.
384. See Ellis, supra note 324, at 420; O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 318, at § 3:08. It is more likely
the threat of a potential lawsuit by the minority shareholders, rather than the probability of success on the
merits, that constrains this strategy. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 324, at 1026, note 12 (noting that it is
difficult for shareholders to succeed in a derivative action challenging a board's decision on executive com-
pensation). But see Thompson, supra note 320, at 1003 (citing language of Aronson v. Lews, 473 A.2d 805,
811 (Del. 1984), that a derivative suit is a "potent tool" to redress the conduct of management).
385. See I.R.C. §§ 410(b); 401(a)(4) (1994).
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coverage rules of Code Section 410(b).386
Note that even the "leakage" portion of the employer's contribution to the qualified
plan has the potential for longer term benefits for the controlling shareholders that are
not present under the corporate dividend option. Employee morale and productivity may
be enhanced by participation in the plan. Any resulting increases in the revenues and
profits of the business can inure to the benefit of the controlling shareholders in the form
of higher employee compensation. This higher compensation will be less susceptible to
claims of unreasonableness or excessiveness by both the Internal Revenue Service and
minority shareholders.387
As the above discussion illustrates, the closely held corporation model is unique be-
cause closely held corporations can use retirement plans as a mechanism to direct excess
revenues of the business to controlling shareholders. Closely held corporations are not
unique, however, in that they are subject to the same employee recruitment and retention
competitive pressures as publicly traded corporations and owner-employee
businesses.38 To compete for educated and highly skilled workers, closely held corpora-
tions must offer retirement plan benefits.389 When a closely held corporation competes
against publicly traded corporations for these types of workers, generous retirement
benefits become even more important. Closely held corporations cannot match the in-
centives based on publicly traded stock offered by publicly traded corporations.3" Offer-
ing more generous retirement plan benefits is one way for the closely held corporation to
overcome this disadvantage.
C. Implications for Lawmakers
The targeted reform theory presents a useful analytical tool for lawmakers to evalu-
ate the likely effectiveness of proposed legislation in achieving targeted pension reform.
386. See discussion supra Part I.B. 'Leakage" to the rank-and-file employees can be further minimized if
the employer takes maximum advantage of the rules available under Code Section 401(a)(4), such as integra-
tion and so-called "new comparability" plans. See Dilley, supra note 7, at 1171-79 (discussing integration);
IRS Notice 2000-14, 2000-10 I.R.B. 737 (Feb. 24, 2000) (describing Internal Revenue Service concerns over
new comparability plans); MCGILL, supra note 63, at 79-83 (describing operation of the general test for com-
pliance with Code Section 401(a)(4)). Such loopholes, used to shift more of the benefits of the qualified plan
to the highly compensated employees, certainly must be addressed as part of comprehensive legislative agenda
designed to achieve targeted pension reform. See discussion infra Part 1V.C. The complex regulations that
implement Code Section 401(a)(4), and how pension tax law experts can manipulate these rules to allocate a
greater level of benefits to highly compensated employees, is beyond the scope of this article. The Internal
Revenue Service is well-aware of how these rules are used in practice, and is in the process of developing
regulations to curtail abuses. See Bonner Menking, Officials Present Guidance Update, Review "New Com-
patibility' Regs, 89 TAx NoTES 341-342.
387. Under federal tax caselaw, the "reasonableness" of executive compensation for purposes of Code
Section 162(a) is determined by a multiple-factor test that considers, among other factors, the net earnings of
the employer, the levels of executive compensation paid by companies of similar size, revenues, and profits,
and the rate of investor return. See Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commir, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999); O.S.C. &
Assocs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 187 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999). Claims by minority shareholders of excessive com-
pensation paid to controlling shareholders are resolved under principles of state corporation law. See, e.g.,
Crowley v. Communications for Hospitals, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 573 N.E.2d 996 (1991).
388. See McGILL, supra note 333.
389. See id.
390. See sources cited supra note 329.
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Applying the targeted reform theory to current legislative proposals reveals that, if en-
acted, these proposals are likely to be ineffective or, even worse, counterproductive to
the expansion of retirement plan coverage.
1. More Rules Based on Employer Size Will Not Significantly Expand Coverage
The targeted reform theory predicts that creating separate sets of qualified plan rules
based on the number of employees will not significantly expand the scope of retirement
plan coverage. The employer's decision-making process for plan sponsorship and cover-
age design is a function of its governance and taxation characteristics. Employer size is
only a rough surrogate for these factors. Therefore, creating special sets of qualified plan
rules based on employer size is unlikely to stimulate new plan sponsorship among
smaller employers.
The proposed SAFE plan is unlikely to inspire owner-employee businesses to spon-
sor new defined benefit plans. Employee demand for defined benefit plans is low. The
revenue commitment to funding and investment risk for the owner-employee is high.
Simplified administration alone will not overcome these deterrents.
In contrast, SIMPLE plans for smaller employers avoid these disadvantages of SAFE
plans. In the longer-term, however, SIMPLE plans pose two potential obstacles to the
owner-employee's transition from an entry-level 401(k) plan to a plan funded by em-
ployer contributions. First, the revenue threshold for a plan requiring significant em-
ployer contributions is obviously much higher than for a 401(k) plan funded solely by
the workers themselves. To reach this higher revenue threshold the business will need to
further grow and expand. Growth in excess of the arbitrary 100 employee threshold will
force the employer to terminate or amend the SIMPLE plan to conform to the rules for
401(k) plans.
Second, assuming the employer can reach the higher revenue threshold without ex-
ceeding the 100-employee limit, the employer cannot maintain the SIMPLE plan if it
sponsors any other retirement plan (other than a defined benefit SAFE plan, an unattrac-
tive option). Before the employer may add a retirement plan funded by employer contri-
butions (the most likely choice being a profit sharing plan), it must either terminate the
SIMPLE plan or amend its design to comply with the rules for 401(k) plans. Thus the
SIMPLE plan approach creates a disincentive for the smaller employer to make this key
transition beyond the employee-funded 401(k) plan.
A broader policy concern is that creating multiple sets of plan design rules based on
employer size only adds to the complexity of the overall pension tax law system.39" ' Per-
haps this additional systemic complexity perhaps could be justified if it were likely to
result in a significant expansion of pension plan coverage among smaller employers. But
the empirical research demonstrates that plan administrative costs are not a decisive
factor in the smaller employer's decision to sponsor a retirement plan.392
2. Higher IRA and 401(k) Contributions Limits Are Counterproductive
The targeted reform model predicts that higher limits for contributions to IRAs will
391. See sources cited supra note 113 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 351-353 and accompanying text.
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be counterproductive to the goals of targeted pension reform because such higher limits
will decrease worker demand for employer-sponsored retirement plans. Similarly,
higher limits for 401(k) plan contributions will decrease worker demand for a retirement
plan funded by employer contributions. The likely result of these proposed legislative
changes will be to slow, not stimulate, the growth of new plan sponsorship for 401(k)
plans and employer-funded retirement plans. In addition, higher 401(k) plan contribu-
tion limits will increase the distributional inequities in the pension tax law system with-
out improving the retirement income security of low-income workers.
3. Requiring Broader Coverage Will Not Trigger Plan Terminations or Deter New
Plans
Another significant insight provided by the targeted reform theory is that the govern-
ance characteristics of publicly traded and closely held corporations provide strong in-
centives for them to exclude as many workers from retirement plan coverage as is le-
gally permissible under the coverage rules. The targeted reform theory demonstrates
why, absent government compulsion, these employers are unlikely to voluntarily expand
the scope of pension coverage. Because plan sponsorship is voluntary, the perceived
danger in amending the coverage rules has always been that employers will refuse to
adopt retirement plans or, worse yet, decide to terminate their existing retirement
plans.393
The typical public political debate over broadening the coverage rules for qualified
plans to make retirement plans more inclusive is like a game of chicken. Reforms to
make the coverage rules more inclusive are proposed. Employers counter with the dra-
matic threat that they will terminate their plans rather than suffer the increased costs of
expanded coverage. But the threat cannot be selective - the plan is an all-or-nothing
proposition for the employer.
Given today's robust economy and tight labor market, legislation that closes the cov-
erage loopholes in the pension tax laws is unlikely to trigger a counterproductive back-
lash of plan terminations by employers. For both the publicly traded and closely held
corporation models, the impact of terminating a pre-existing retirement plan in response
to more inclusive coverage rules would have a dramatic effect on their workforce, and,
consequently, on business profitability. Such a reaction would immediately put the em-
ployer at a distinct competitive disadvantage in recruiting and retaining the educated and
highly skilled workers who are critical to the continued viability of the business. In addi-
tion, for closely held corporations the motivation to sponsor a retirement plan includes
393. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 5-6. Proponents of this view are likely to point for support to the large
number of defined benefit plans that were terminated during the deficit cycle years after the TAX REFORM
Act of 1986 tightened the coverage rules for qualified plans. See PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN No. 6, ABSTRACT OF 1993 FORM
5500 ANNUAL REPORTS (Winter 1997), Table Fl at 73. Most of these terminations, however, were by smaller
employers who sponsored defined benefit plans with fewer than 100 participants: See id. at 2, table F2 at 74. I
would argue that it was not tighter coverage rules, but rather the changes to the full funding limits for defined
benefit plans enacted by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, that was primarily responsible for
the mass termination of defined benefit plans by small employers in the following years. See Stretching the
Pension Dollar, supra note 40, at 3-7.
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providing additional compensation to the controlling shareholder-employees. Terminat-
ing an established retirement plan would be counterproductive to this.objective. More-
over, for those closely held corporations that are family-owned, terminating the com-
pany's retirement plan could present a significant obstacle to the eventual transfer of the
business to younger generations. Without a plan to provide income during retirement,
the older generation of controlling shareholders may be forced to sell the business to
outside investors to fund their retirement years.
For some employers, including more employees in their pre-existing retirement plan
may prove too costly due to the benefit structure of the plan. If this is the case, the em-
ployer has a much less drastic option available than terminating the plan. The employer
can simply amend the plan benefit design so that it becomes affordable. 3" Does this
mean that some participants in the plan are likely to receive a lower level of retirement
benefits? Certainly. But this is exactly the type of policy trade-off that should be, but
currently is not, the subject of open and vigorous legislative and public debate.
Amending the coverage rules to make them more inclusive also is unlikely to deter
the sponsorship of new retirement plans by employers. Most established businesses
already sponsor retirement plans.395 It is newer and smaller employers, represented by
the owner-employee model, who are the most likely not to sponsor any type of retire-
ment plan for their employees.396 Amending the coverage rules to make retirement plans
more inclusive is unlikely to deter these employers from sponsoring a new retirement
plan. Due to their relatively small numbers of employees, these businesses are the least
able to utilize the provisions in the plan coverage rules that larger employers use to ex-
clude certain groups of workers from retirement plan coverage.3" Instead, employee
demand for retirement plan benefits is the driving force behind the employer's decision
to sponsor a retirement plan.
V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR TARGETED PENSION REFORM LEGISLATION
For reform to be sustainable in the long term, amendments to the pension tax laws
should attempt to minimize the cyclical effect of the budget balancing process on pen-
sion tax policy and thus minimize the instability and uncertainty in the system. This can
be done in two general ways: (1) by developing legislation that strategically targets the
pension tax expenditure toward broadening the coverage base rather than increasing the
tax-subsidized retirement benefits available to highly compensated employees; and (2)
by focusing legislative attention on obstacles to and incentives for new plan sponsorship
that are the least susceptible to budgetary cycles.
394. This option is likely to be much more appealing to the sponsoring employer than terminating the
plan. Legally, plan amendment is a much more simple affair than plan termination. From a practical perspec-
tive, a plan amendment to reduce the level of future benefits will have a much less dramatic effect on the
employer's ability to recruit new employees. Potential employees obviously can distinguish between an em-
ployer with no retirement plan and an employer who has a retirement plan. It is much more difficult, however,
for a potential employee to evaluate the "quality" of benefits under competing retirement plans offered by
prospective employers.
395. See discussion supra Part I.A.
396. See supra Table 1 (Coverage Rates by Occupation), note 19 and accompanying text.
397. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
2001]
Journal of Legislation
A. Targeted Pension Reform Legislation to Broaden the Coverage Base
The traditional approach to pension reform attempts to encourage, but not compel,
employers to broaden the scope of retirement plan coverage by substantially increasing
the limitations rules for qualified plans.398 The targeted reform theory demonstrates why
this approach is unlikely to produce significant gains in the scope of pension
coverage."' A targeted reform approach to broadening the coverage base instead would
amend the coverage and eligibility rules governing qualified plans to require more com-
prehensive coverage of the employer's workforce.' This approach would result in re-
tirement plan coverage for more rank-and-file employees. Making the coverage and
eligibility rules more inclusive will certainly increase the aggregate pension tax expendi-
ture because more workers will benefit from the pension tax subsidy. But, contrary to
current proposals to reform the pension tax laws, this increase in the overall pension tax
expenditure would result in a more equitable pension tax law system. Targeted pension
reform would primarily benefit low-income workers who are in lower income brackets.
In contrast, current reform proposals would primarily benefit highly compensated em-
ployees who are in higher income tax brackets, thereby making the pension tax law
system as a whole less equitable.
1. Amending the Coverage Rules
The coverage rules of Code Section 410(b) have remained unchanged since the Tax
Reform Act of 1986."° An obvious first step would be to increase the percentage of non-
highly compensated employees required to be covered by the plan. °2 This could be done
by repealing the ratio percentage prong of current Code Section 410(b)(1)(B). 403 Quali-
fied plan coverage should be determined by requiring that a straightforward percentage
of the employer's non-highly compensated employees must be included in the plan.
What should the appropriate percentage be? One scholar has suggested a 100% cov-
erage rule for non-highly compensated employees.' Requiring a 100% coverage rate
for non-highly compensated employees, however, may prove to be politically impracti-
cal. 5 I propose an incremental approach to reforming the ratio percentage test by phas-
ing in higher standards over a period of years, with a final goal of required coverage 'n
the 90% range. A variation of this approach (and one conducive to political compro-
mise) would be to link higher limitations rules amounts for highly compensated employ-
ees to higher plan coverage percentages for the non-highly compensated employees,
again based on a straightforward percentage of non-highly compensated employees
covered test.
As second and third steps toward broadening the coverage base, Congress should
398. See supra Part ll.A. 1.
399. See supra Part IH.B.
400. See supra Part LB.1-2.
401. See supra Part LB.2.
402. See supra Part I.B.2.
403. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
404. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 38-39.
405. See Muir, supra note 25, at 213-15.
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consider repealing the average benefits test, and reform the SLOB rules to require a
showing of competitive necessity. 4°6 Although the number of employers that rely on
these-tests to satisfy the coverage rules for qualified plans is relatively small, those em-
ployers who use these rules are likely to vigorously oppose their repeal or reform. Con-
gressional lawmakers will have to make an informed policy judgment concerning the
estimated coverage gains to be made by repealing or reforming these provisions of the
coverage rules.
2. Amending the Eligibility Rules
Given the high degree of mobility of today's workforce, it seems absurd to con-
tinue with eligibility rules that have remained unchanged since the enactment of ERISA
in 1974. 07 As a first step toward modernizing the eligibility rules, the one year of ser-
vice rule should be repealed for 401(k) plans. All employees should be immediately
eligible to begin participating in their new employer's 401(k) plan.' Although immedi-
ate eligibility is likely to increase the administrative costs of the 401(k) plan for employ-
ers with high levels of employee turnover, these increased costs can be offset by enact-
ing other proposals to simplify the administration of qualified plans.'0
Second, Congress should modernize the eligibility rules for non-401(k) plans by
shortening the one year of service rule for eligibility. Amending the eligibility rules for
non-401(k) retirement plans will likely be strongly opposed by employers. Shortening
the year of service rule for these plans will require the employer to more quickly make
contributions to the plan for new employees. Although employers are unlikely to re-
spond by terminating their retirement plans, they may choose to offset any increased
costs by amending the plan to reduce the level of benefits for all participants. Thus, the
policy "price" for increasing the scope of retirement plan coverage for some low-income
employees may be a slightly lower level of benefits for all employees of the employer.
Clearly, the political battle over such a proposal to reform the eligibility rules for non-
401(k) plans will be intense. The purpose of this article is not to conclusively resolve the
controversy, but rather to introduce competing ideas for reform to make these types of
important policy trade-offs the subject of open and vigorous legislative and public de-
bate.
3. Amending the Vesting Rules
Like the eligibility rules, today's vesting requirements for qualified plans have be-
come outdated. Under current law, the employer may choose between a vesting schedule
where partial vesting begins at three years, gradually increasing to full vesting at seven
years, 410 or a vesting schedule where the employee is not vested until five years, at
406. See supra Part I.B.2.
407. See supra Part I.B. 1.
408. Congress has already moved to encourage employers to adopt immediate eligibility for 401(k) plan
participation by exempting first year participants from inclusion in the plan's ADP test. See Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1459, 110 Stat. 1755, 1820.
409. See discussion infra Part 1V.B.
410. See I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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which time he becomes fully vested.4 ' Under either type of vesting schedule, the new
employee will not become even partially vested until the employee completes at least
three years of service. Consequently, the vesting rules pose a serious obstacle to achiev-
ing retirement income security for today's mobile workers. To achieve targeted pension
reform, it will not be enough for Congress to amend the coverage and eligibility rules
for qualified plans. A less lengthy vesting schedule should be included as part of a com-
prehensive legislative package aimed at targeted pension reform.
B. Addressing Non-Revenue Obstacles and Incentives to New Plan Sponsorship
The targeted pension reform proposals described above primarily are directed toward
expanding the scope of coverage among employers who already sponsor a retirement
plan for their employees, but who exclude low-income workers from participating in the
plan. The other group of workers who tend to lack pension coverage are employees who
work for an employer who does not sponsor any type of retirement plan for its employ-
ees. This section focuses on targeted reforms that will expand the scope of pension cov-
erage by encouraging employees to sponsor new retirement plans.
1. Administrative Simplification
A close examination of current proposals to simplify the administration of qualified
plans reveals that such proposals can be divided into two groups. One group of propos-
als truly simplifies plan administration. The other group of proposals masquerade under
the rubric of simplification, but actually serve to redistribute a larger share of the pen-
sion tax subsidy to higher-income employees. The line between the two is easy to di-
vine. Proposals to amend the rules for direct rollovers, required minimum distributions,
reporting requirements, and compliance correction programs412 are aimed at true simpli-
fication. These measures are projected to have a negligible revenue effect." 3 Although
administrative costs are not the primary deterrent to new plan sponsorship among em-
ployers,4"4 enacting reform legislation aimed at true administrative simplification can
only help in achieving higher levels of plan sponsorship.
Proposals to amend the top-heavy rules and reduce the level of employer contribu-
tions necessary to exempt 401(k) plans from ADP testing are disguised efforts to redis-
tribute a larger share of the pension tax subsidy to higher-income employees.4 5 The
empirical evidence indicates that the tax benefits to these employees are not a primary
motivating factor in the employer's decision to sponsor a new retirement plan. 4 6 These
proposals should be rejected by lawmakers committed to targeted pension reform. They
will only serve to increase the distributional inequities in the pension tax law system
without expanding the scope of retirement plan coverage.
411. See I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
412. See supra Part M.A.4.
413. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
414. See supra Part mn.B.2.
415. See supra Parts I.B.C. and II.A.4.
416. See supra Part II.B.2.
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2. Promoting a More Efficient Market for Plan Administrative Services
Current proposed legislation focuses on stimulating new plan sponsorship by provid-
ing one-time tax credits for smaller employers who initiate a retirement plan." 7 A com-
plementary, but longer lasting, approach to encouraging plan sponsorship would be to
reduce the plan administrative costs for all employers by promoting a more efficient
market for plan administrative services.
The Department of Labor's own study of the fees charged by plan service providers
for administering 401(k) plans indicates that there is not a competitive market for plan
administrative services.41 8 Smaller employers, in particular, are harmed by the uncompe-
titive market for plan administrative services because their options for service providers
tend to be limited to their local geographic market. The small number of participants in
the plan may not meet the minimum number of plan participants required by larger na-
tional service providers. One way to make the market for plan administrative services
more competitive would be to facilitate the smaller employer's ability to compare the
fees and services offered by different service providers. Proposed legislation could fa-
cilitate this information-gathering process by requiring the Department of Labor to
maintain a voluntary registry or on-line database of plan service providers, their fees and
services, and how to contact them.
41 9
3. Stimulate Employee Demand Through Effective Public Education
One of the primary factors motivating an employer to sponsor a new retirement plan
is employee demand for retirement benefits. Congress should require, and adequately
fund, a sustained and aggressive program of broad-based public education concerning
the need to plan and save for retirement.42 ° Public education programs should particu-
larly focus on low-income workers and younger workers. For both groups the emphasis
should be not on the immediate income tax savings from 401(k) plan salary deferrals
(likely to be a low priority for these groups of workers), but rather on the economic
magic of earning a pre-tax rate of investment return over a long period of time.
411
VI. CONCLUSION: COMPLETING THE TARGETED PENSION REFORM AGENDA
The proposals described in Part IV are initial steps toward achieving the goals of tar-
geted pension reform. But other (and much more technical) loopholes in the pension tax
law system remain. The most prominent of these loopholes are the rules governing con-
tingent workers422 and the complex rules governing the distribution of plan benefits
417. See supra Part ll.A.3.
418. See PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, STUDY OF 401(K) PLAN FEES AND
EXPENSES, Section IV, April 13, 1998, (visited Oct. 3, 2000) <http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba>.
419. For an example of what such a database might look like, see Mandelker, supra note 41, at 91-96.
420. Congress previously legislated a public education program under the auspices of the Department of
Labor in the Savings Are Vital to Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997 (SAVER). I discuss the SAVER public
education initiative elsewhere and argue that it is unlikely to be effective in changing retirement savings be-
havior. See Medill, supra note 21, at 49-50.
421. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 26. Contingent workers are further subdivided into leased employees and independ-
ent contractors. Code Section 414(n) governs the treatment of leased employees. See I.R.C. § 414(n) (1994 &
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under Code Section 401(a)(4).42 3 The abuse of these rules by employers is well-known
to government regulators.424 Reform of these rules will be necessary to complete a com-
prehensive legislative agenda aimed at targeted pension reform.
Requiring employers to broaden the scope of retirement plan coverage without also
addressing these additional rules is akin to placing a large rock in an even larger stream-
-the flow of pension money will simply be redirected via these complex loopholes. Em-
ployers are likely to react to more inclusive coverage rules by taking advantage of the
contingent worker rules and re-characterizing their workers as leased employees or in-
dependent contractors. Employers also are likely to react to expanded coverage by using
Code Section 401(a)(4) rules to redesign retirement plans to distribute a greater share of
benefits to highly compensated employees. For targeted pension reform to be successful,
Congressional lawmakers must anticipate these types of reactions by employers, and
reform additional rules accordingly.
The purpose of this article is less ambitious. This article shows why targeted pension
reform is needed, and argues that such reform can be achieved without undermining the
voluntary nature of our private retirement plan system. Reforming the pension tax sys-
tem should be a national priority. Today, Congress has an historic opportunity to
change the course of national retirement policy. They can choose to target the pension
tax subsidy for the greater benefit of workers who are most at risk of having an inade-
quate retirement income. This article lays the basis for a legislative agenda involving
precisely that sort of targeted pension reform.
Supp. IV 1998). The classification of workers as independent contractors rather than employees is governed by
a 20-factor test. See IRS Rev. Rul. 87-41.
423. LR.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994).
424. See, e.g., Pensions: Letters Reveal Split In Pension Industry Over "Comparability" Cross-Testing
Methods, DAtLY TAx REP. J-1 (June 13, 2000) (discussing Code Section 401(a)(4)); Jacob M. Schlesinger and
Eben Shapiro, U.S. Challenges Time Warner on Benefits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1998, at B20.
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